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IntroductIon
The Fourth Industrial Revolution is characterised by the extensive use of the 
internet and the computerisation & roboticisation of all spheres of the econo-
my. Its symbols today are smartphones and electric cars, but in the near future 
we will witness the creation and use of smart cities, smart electrical grids and 
smart factories. Today’s industry is changing at an unprecedented rate. The 
earlier industrial revolutions, i.e. periods of fundamental changes in the modes 
of production and communication, proceeded at a much slower pace than those 
we are observing today. The first industrial revolution utilised coal and steam 
to mechanise production and transport. The second disseminated the means of 
mass production by the use of electricity and the internal combustion engine. 
The third, digital revolution, which began in the middle of the last century, 
automated industrial production and globalised communication. The German 
economy, which reached a very high level of sophistication in the industries of 
the first and second industrial revolutions – in heavy industry, electronics and 
the automotive branch – did not benefit so greatly from the digital revolution.
The Fourth Industrial Revolution is radically changing the nature of the economy 
and society as it embraces most traditional industries. Machinery and vehicles, 
increasingly saturated with electronics, must be able to communicate and collabo-
rate with other devices. Specialised software is evolving to read and interpret hu-
man speech. Technological advances have changed the logic of operation in the 
economic sectors in which Germany has had a dominant market position for dec-
ades. The solution may not lie in further process innovations, in which the Ger-
man small- and medium-sized enterprises have hitherto specialised by continu-
ing their decades-long family traditions. In order to maintain a market position, 
it is no longer enough to design a slightly more efficient, higher-quality version of 
the previous model of the product; rather, it is necessary to add completely new 
features and technologies. Success in the automotive industry no longer depends 
on producing reliable high-quality cars, but on devising a method for produc-
ing vehicles capable of driving autonomously and cooperating with other equip-
ment (such as city GPS systems), and which should also be ecologically friendly 
(for example, powered by electric engines). The technological breakthrough re-
lated to the fourth industrial revolution is bringing about significant transfor-
mations of markets, something which threatens the strong position of German 
companies, especially in the production of machinery, equipment and vehicles1.
1 ‘Industrie 4.0 Digitale Wirtschaft und Impulse für Wachstum, Beschäftigung und In-
novations’, Federal Ministry of Economy and Energy, April 2015, https://www.bmwi.de/
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
6
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 0
4/
20
19
These technological changes are occurring at a time when the ability of Ger-
man society to absorb innovation is decreasing. The demographic crisis has led 
to a systematic shrinking of the number of German companies. As they retire, 
many of their owners are having trouble finding successors, and the difficul-
ties which businesses have in gaining access to skilled workers are increasing. 
The traditional infrastructure is aging, and the development of the digital in-
frastructure is proceeding slowly. Moreover the banks, which are accustomed 
to working with the traditional industries, are reluctant to finance risky ven-
tures in the field of new technologies.
This report, which considers the whole context of these technological changes, 
is intended to contribute to the discussion of the situation in which German in-
dustry finds itself in the face of the ever closer integration of industrial produc-
tion with digital technologies, and is focused on the German state’s response to 
the challenges of the digitisation of industry. The report has been prepared on 
the basis of German government documents, academic publications, studies 
by associations of experts and industries, and data from the Federal Statistical 
Office of Germany & international organisations. An important addition to the 
collected materials comes from interviews with German experts from public 
institutions, industry associations and non-governmental organisations who 
have been dealing with the subject of industrial policy.
The very definition of the term ‘industrial policy’ is ambiguous, because in an 
era of ever closer integration of industrial production and digital technology, it 
is difficult to draw a precise boundary between industrial and non-industrial 
sectors. This publication adopts a broad definition of ‘industrial policy’ as any 
action taken by the state which is aimed, in a direct or indirect way, at improving 
the situation or prospects for the development of companies related to industry. 
German state initiatives in this area include the creation of favourable legal, in-
frastructural, social and financial conditions to maintain the important role of 
industry in the economy and its high competitiveness on foreign markets2. 
The report discusses the role of industry in the German economy, the posi-
tion of German industry in global trade, and also outlines the unique features 
Redaktion/DE/Publikationen/Industrie/industrie-4-0-und-digitale-wirtschaft.pdf?__
blob=publicationFile&v=3, p. 3.
2 A specifically German feature is the fact that these activities are not usually referred to as 
‘industrial policy’, but rather in terms such as ‘environmental policy’, ‘the policy of improv-
ing the attractiveness of the investment (Standortpolitik)’ or ‘the policy of innovation’. 
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of the German economic model which favours the development of industry. 
It presents the main problems facing Germany with the coming of the Fourth 
Industrial Revolution, and also describes the attempts to overcome them with-
in the concept of ‘Industry 4.0’, which is the cornerstone of the country’s new 
industrial policy. This analysis covers the organisation of German industrial 
policy, discussing the main institutions involved in it, as well as the scope of its 
support from public funding. The Annex presents the main stages in the laying 
of the foundations of German industrial policy. The last chapter includes four 
case studies as a contribution to the analysis: the influence of the German state 
on the structure of the economy, the means to maintain its end-state branches3 
(the shipbuilding industry is the example here), to reinforce the position of the 
stronger industries (the automotive industry), and to develop new technolo-
gies (the renewable energy industry).
3 The term ‘end-stage industry’ includes companies that have little chance of dynamic develop-
ment, and whose survival would be in jeopardy without financial assistance from the state.
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The main Theses 
• The financial and economic crisis of 2008 exposed the weaknesses of the 
service-based economies while boosting those with a strong industrial 
base, such as Germany. The manufacturing branches generate 23% added 
value to the GDP of Germany, provide 34% of the jobs, and pay wages which 
are 21% above the average in the German economy. 90% of private-sector 
expenditure on research and development is generated by firms associated 
with industry. Thanks to the structure of the economy, Germany has been 
able to maintain stable economic growth, low unemployment and the sus-
tainability of its public finances, and to achieve a high level of trade surplus.
• Germany has been able to create a balanced structure of its economy, in 
which a strong small- and medium-sized enterprise sector (SMEs) exists 
side by side with many global-level German industrial companies. In this 
structure, the state plays the role of moderator, regulator and enforcer of 
regulations, taking care to maintain social sustainability. The key determi-
nants of economic success, and an objective of the state’s industrial policy, 
include supporting exports and maintaining a high level of trade surplus. 
This assumption has proved successful over the last two decades, as one of 
the main engines of growth for German industry has been foreign expan-
sion. The industrialisation of developing countries in Central Europe, Asia 
and Latin America has increased global demand for industrial goods.
• The Fourth Industrial Revolution, characterised by the widespread use of 
the internet and digital technologies in all spheres of the economy, is bring-
ing about a transformation of the markets, and is threatening the hitherto 
strong position of German companies, especially in the production of ma-
chinery, equipment and cars. The important problems for Germany associ-
ated with this trend include: an insufficient number of qualified employees, 
an underdeveloped digital infrastructure, weakening entrepreneurship, 
and difficulty in maintaining a high level of education. The rapid aging of 
German society is leading to lower human capital resources, a reduction 
in the number of companies, and a disinclination to adapt to new tech-
nologies. Moreover the banks, which are used to working with traditional 
industries, are unwilling to finance risky enterprises in new areas of the 
economy.
• Another challenge for Germany is the entrance into the automotive sector 
of new, innovative leaders such as Tesla, and IT giants such as Apple, Google 
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and China’s Baidu, which have ambitious plans to create autonomous self-
driving cars fully integrated with digital technologies. Moreover, Germa-
ny’s machine industry fears the rapid progress of competition from China, 
which is rapidly catching up and also has large financial resources to im-
plement innovations and buy foreign technology. If German companies do 
not meet the challenge of producing a new generation of vehicles, equip-
ment and machinery which is heavily saturated with digital technology, 
they could lose their role as market leaders and become subcontractors of 
components at a lower level of the value chain.
• The German state’s response to the challenges of the fourth industrial revo-
lution is the concept of ‘Industry 4.0’, that is, the construction not only of 
smart devices, but also of entire production plants capable of autonomously 
coordinating the processes among themselves. German companies need to 
gain a dominant position on the market for smart devices and autonomous 
vehicles, urban mobility systems (e.g. sharing or renting cars), and the 
sales of complex systems for energy production from renewable sources 
and increasing energy efficiency. This requires a radical change in the ex-
isting business models of German manufacturers; they must increase their 
competence in producing software, saturate their products with digital 
technologies, and guarantee their access to the appropriate IT infrastruc-
ture & the necessary data. The government’s priority lies in conducting 
a comprehensive process of digitisation by accelerating the expansion of 
digital infrastructure, improving the digital skills of SMEs, and developing 
e-government services. It is necessary to create favourable legal framework 
and networks of financial instruments which will encourage companies to 
invest in innovative and risky business ventures.
• The priority of German industrial policy is to radically increase spending 
on innovation. In 2015, national spending on science reached 3% of GDP for 
the first time. The budget of the Ministry of Science has increased by leaps 
and bounds, by almost 142% (up to €17 billion) in the years 2005–2017. The 
system of innovation in Germany is focused on supporting research enter-
prises, in contrast to those focused on supporting public research units. 
Non-university scientific institutions form the bedrock of this research, 
especially for smaller businesses.
• The German government assumes that electronic data will be the most im-
portant ‘raw material’ of the twenty-first century, and that the develop-
ment of German industry could be hindered by a lack of digital sovereignty. 
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This term is used in Germany to define the ability of individuals, companies 
and institutions to move freely and conduct their business in cyberspace. 
In the area of industry, one problem for Germany is the expansion in this 
field of non-European IT companies (especially from the US), which are the 
main providers of software for smart equipment. Other potential areas of 
conflict between Germany and the US are regulatory questions in the field 
of digitisation, as well as the dispute over the market shares of American 
IT businesses. These currently control 89% of the global search engine mar-
ket, 98% of the operating systems for smartphones, 89% of mobile applica-
tion distribution channels, 43% of the messaging market, and generate 90% 
of revenues from e-commerce. That is why Germany needs to set interna-
tional norms and standards that will force global manufacturers to develop 
software within a standardised framework and reduce their market domi-
nance. German institutions are conducting advanced analytical research 
on future markets, so they will be ready to compete – either at the EU level 
or on the global stage – for the most favourable legal framework for the de-
velopment of the German digital economy.
• In the field of digitisation, Germany is facing the problem of how to find 
a balance between the development of the market and the expansion of 
German law into new areas of cyberspace, which includes important areas 
of social life. On the one hand, Germany wishes to be a pioneer in the digital 
economy, which requires low bureaucratic and regulatory barriers in or-
der to ensure the greatest possible flexibility for companies with ideas for 
new business models which do not suit the existing legal framework. On 
the other hand, Germany is concerned that a lack of activity by the state in 
devising new laws concerning the digital economy could disrupt the coun-
try’s socio-economic model. One example of this is the spread of false infor-
mation (a.k.a. fake news) in modern social networking (for example, con-
cerning the migration crisis), which could destabilise the political scene in 
the country.
• Industrial policy in Germany is evolving towards supporting the competi-
tiveness of certain industries. An example of Germany’s new approach is 
its strategy for energy transformation. The framework includes a setting 
in the long-term perspective (guaranteed production tariffs for renewable 
energy sources for a 20-year period, and also setting targets to increase the 
share of renewable energy sources in the energy mix by 2050) for develop-
ing renewable energy technologies & energy efficiency in such a way that 
they become a new export commodity for Germany. The main objective has 
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been to change the structure of the energy market by focusing on support 
for renewable energy resources at the expense of plants operating on nu-
clear power, and later carbon fuels as well. One unexpected result of the 
energy transformation was the breaking of the oligopoly of the four largest 
energy companies (E.ON, RWE, Vattenfall and EnBW) in favour of smaller, 
often local manufacturers and providers of electricity. Also, conditions 
were created for cooperation between public institutions, research cen-
tres, enterprises and representatives of civil society. In 2015, Germany was 
the second largest exporter of products in this sector (13.5% of the global 
market) behind China (16.2%). In particular, technologies related to wind 
turbines and energy efficiency may be developed by the mechanical engi-
neering sector, which is very strong in Germany.
• Germany’s industrial policy will not cease providing subsidies and other 
forms of support, especially for industries with structural problems. Ac-
cording to the government, the share of grants declined from 1.1% to 0.8% 
of GDP in the years 2005–2017. However, if we take into account the tax ben-
efits and privileges, the amount of support for the economy actually rises to 
3.5% of GDP. Tax incentives are most often targeted at the end-stage indus-
tries, whereas the direct subsidies reach those industries which need funds 
to adapt to the market situation. Even very strong sectors, such as the au-
tomotive branch, can count on considerable financial aid, often in the form 
of subsidies to improve environmental performance or boost innovation.
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i. indusTry and indusTrial policy in Germany 
1. The importance of industry for the German economy
Industry is the factor which guarantees Germany can maintain its economic 
growth, prosperity and jobs. The manufacturing branches generate 23% of 
added value in Germany’s GDP, and ensure that wages in this sector are about 
21% higher than the average in the German economy4. Industrial enterprises 
employ about 8 million people; but if we add the branches dependent on con-
tracts with the industrial enterprises, this number rises to 15 million5. 
Figure 1. Turnover of the main industrial branches (in € billions) and their 
share in the turnover of all industry (in %), 2016 
Food and tobacco 10% (€191 billion)Other 22% (€416 billion)
Automotive 24% (€444 billion)
Steel and steel products 11% (€200 billion)
Chemical and pharmaceutical 10% (€196 billion)
Engineering 13% (€243 billion)
Electrotechnical 10% (€190 billion)
source: Federal Statistical Office
4 ‘Verdienst auf einen Blick’, Federal Statistical Office 2017, https://www.destatis.de/DE/
Themen/Arbeit/Verdienste/Verdienste-Verdienstunterschiede/_inhalt.html
5 ‘Unsere Industrie Innovativ. Intelligent. International’, Federal Ministry of Economy and 
Energy 2016, https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Publikationen/Industrie/unsere-indus-
trie.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=6
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Figure 2. Employment in major industries in Germany (in millions of per-
sons), 2016
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source: Federal Statistical Office
Of all the manufacturing branches, the highest turnover (€444 billion, repre-
senting 24% of German industry’s total turnover) is generated by the automo-
tive sector. Vehicle and parts manufacturers taken together only come third 
in terms of the number of jobs they create (800,000), although their indirect 
influence on the German economy is greater because they create demand for 
goods from the machine-building, chemical and electrical branches.
In second place in terms of turnover comes the machine-building industry, 
which generates 13% of turnover of all industries and employs the most work-
ers, more than 1 million. Next in the table come the steel industry6 (11% of turn-
over, 900,000 jobs), chemical and pharmaceutical (10%, 300,000), food and to-
bacco (10%, 700,000) and electrical engineering (10%, 800,000).
6 The steel industry includes producers of raw steel, but also of steel products. Hence the num-
ber is higher than the number of German workers in steel foundries, who number about 
87,000.
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Figure 3. Revenues of selected industries per 1 employee (€ thousands), 2016
Chemical and pharmaceutical
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Machinery
Steel and steel products
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source: Federal Statistical Office
The situation is different when the industries are classified in terms of revenue 
generated per employee. At the top of this list is the chemical and pharma-
ceutical industry, which brings a turnover of €585,000 per employee. Slightly 
lower revenue per employee (€524,000) is generated by the automotive indus-
try, followed by the food and tobacco, electrical engineering, machine and steel 
branches.
Figure 4. The most trusted car brand among consumers in China and the US
Audi BMW Mercedes Volkswagen Porche Ford Buick Toyota
China
Toyota Honda BMW Ford Mercedes Audi Chevrolet Nissan
USA
German brand American brand Japanese brand
0
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source: ‘Raport: Image deutscher nach Marken VW scandal’, https://www.globe-one.com/wp-content/
uploads/2018/06/Globeone_Image-deutscher-Marken-nach-VW-Skandal_deutsch.pdf
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The special role which the automotive industry plays in the German economy is 
confirmed by its results on the global markets. From the results of surveys con-
ducted by Globe One in 2015 among consumers in the United States and China, 
it appears that the five automotive brands most trusted by respondents in China 
come from Germany (Audi, BMW, Mercedes, Volkswagen and Porsche), whereas 
American respondents choose two German (Mercedes and BMW) brands. Ger-
man automotive brands are primarily associated with very good quality, prestige, 
reliability and environmental performance. It follows that German automotive 
brands enjoy a high reputation on two important markets. In recent years China 
has been among the fastest growing automotive markets in the world. In contrast, 
the US example shows that Germany could increase production on the very com-
petitive markets of countries which themselves have strong automotive sectors.
Although the revenues generated per capita in the electrical industry, machin-
ery and steel products are lower than those in the automotive industry, the role 
of these sectors in the German economy is also extremely important. It is mainly 
companies from these sectors which belong to the category referred to as the ‘hid-
den champions’, the existence of which is an element distinguishing Germany 
from other highly developed economies. These are often family-run small- and 
medium-sized enterprises, unknown to the wider public, which have very strong 
global positions on particular niche markets7. These companies are characterised 
by three features: a large share of exports in their sales, the production of highly 
specialised products, and considerable flexibility in adapting to customer needs8. 
No other country has so many leaders in market niches as Germany. Thanks to 
many years of hard work on process innovations, they have achieved high level 
of quality for their products, which are unique on the global scale. The strategy 
of these companies gives them genuinely high profitability and market stability, 
but it is also a barrier to their achieving the position of global-level corporations.
2. German industry against the background of global competition
The period after the global financial crisis was a time when countries with 
strong industrial bases were appreciated. The failure to maintain manufactur-
ing production and the focus on services led to social tensions in many devel-
oped countries. Many workers see themselves as the losers of globalisation, as 
many of them have lost jobs as a result of the relocation of production plants to 
7 H. Simon, Hidden Champions: Aufbruch nach Globalia, Campus, Frankfurt 2012, pp. 83–84.
8 ‘Innovationsindikator 2015’, ACATECH and the German Industry Association, https://www.
acatech.de/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Innovationsindikator_2015_Web.pdf, p. 7.
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
16
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 0
4/
20
19
developing countries. The negative effects of this trend were not balanced out 
by the rapid development of the financial sector, which created jobs for people 
with completely different qualifications. Governments are also coming under 
increasing pressure from new social and political anti-globalisation move-
ments, which are increasingly popular in structurally weak regions and are 
increasing their influence over major policy decisions. At the centre of contro-
versial events in Anglo-Saxon countries, such as the decision by the UK to leave 
the EU and the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States, are 
disputes over the role of industry in the economy.
Against this background, Germany has stood out as being able to resist the trend 
of de-industrialisation and maintain the important role of manufacturing sec-
tors in its economy, which represent a success against the background of a de-
clining share of industrial production in the most highly developed countries9. 
Before 2009, Anglo-Saxon economists in particular had perceived the German 
economy as being inefficient, outdated, and incapable of innovation or moving 
onto the path of rapid economic growth10. Since the outbreak of the global finan-
cial crisis, however, the German economy has gained a reputation as one of the 
strongest in the world, due to the rapid pace at which it lifted itself out of reces-
sion, the labour market’s resilience, and the ability to develop the world’s highest 
trade surplus. During this time, the thesis regained popularity that a healthy 
industry boosts the circulation to other areas of economic activity, because it is 
part of the traditional economy, based on real production granting stable eco-
nomic growth. The unilateral support for service-based economies and the IT 
sector, and a disregard for those with a strong industrial base, has turned out 
to be unjustified. In Germany 85% of expenditure on research and develop-
ment is funded by industry11. Good results for industries such as the automotive, 
9 German society has not always showed full openness to the needs of German industry, as 
demonstrated by the considerable public resistance to the signing of the Transatlantic Part-
nership in the field of trade and EU investment with the US. Germany had the opportuni-
ty to be the biggest beneficiary of this agreement, but public opinion was concerned that 
the agreement would lead to a deterioration of food standards in Germany, and could also 
limit the sovereignty of German courts. The agreement provided for the settlement of dis-
putes between US investors and European countries within the framework of transnation-
al investment tribunals, which could de facto have limited the powers of state institutions. 
K. Popławski, ‘Germany's stance on the TTIP. Background, interests and concerns’, OSW 
Studies, 24 March 2015: https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-studies/2015-03-24/
germanys-stance-ttip-background-interests-and-concerns
10 T. Schulz, ‘How the German economy became a model’, Der Spiegel, 21 May 2012, http://www.spiegel.
de/international/business/the-us-discovers-germany-as-an-economic-role-model-a-822167.html
11 ‘Wirtschaftspolitische der Positionen 2015 IHK-Organisation’, German Chamber of Com-
merce, Berlin 2015, p. 42.
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machine-building, chemical and electrical engineering branches have allowed 
Germany to remain at the forefront of the biggest goods exporters in the world12. 
The strong position of German industry has also strengthened the country’s po-
sition as the leader of the European Union. According to Eurostat, in 2016 Ger-
many made up 21% of the EU’s added value to GDP, and in the case of industrial 
production, its share in added value rose to 30%.
Figure 5. The share of manufacturing sectors in the creation of value added to 
GDP in selected countries in 1996 and 2016* (in %) 
Germany France Spain Italy United 
Kingdom
Japan South
Korea
PolandUnited
States
22.2
15.8
11.4
20.4
16.3 17.0
10.1
16.6
12.3
21.2
26.8
29.3
20.9 20.4
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
23.6
14.2
17.7
22.9
[%]
1996 2016
source: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
* Data for the United States comes from 2015, as no later information is available.
Figure 6. Changes in current account balance in the period 1996–2016 (in per-
centage points)
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2.3
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1.8
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Kingdom
Japan South
Korea
PolandUnited
States
source: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
12 In 2003–2008 Germany was the largest exporter of goods in the world. Since 2009, Germany 
has been overtaken by China, and by the United States since 2010.
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In the period 1996–2016, only two of the most developed countries shown in the 
chart were able to defend themselves against a decline in the share of industry 
in creating value added to their GDPs: South Korea and Germany. South Ko-
rea increased this percentage by 2.5 percentage points, to 29.3%, and Germany 
increased it by 0.7 percentage points, to 22.9%. In most other countries there 
has been a serious decline, as in Spain (by 4.5 percentage points, p.p.), Italy 
(3.9 p.p.), France (4.3 p.p.), the US (by 4.3 p.p.) and the UK (6.9 p.p.). To a lesser 
extent, the share of value added to GDP generated by industry also fell in other 
countries: Japan (2.4 p.p.) and Poland (0.5 p.p.). The decrease in the role of in-
dustry has had serious consequences for the stability of these countries’ econo-
mies. Many of the countries experiencing the trend of deindustrialisation have 
seen deterioration in their trade balances in the period 1996–2016. This trend 
was observed in France (a reduction in the current account balance of 2.1 p.p.), 
Italy (-0.6 p.p.), the UK (-5.2 p.p.) and the US (-0.9 p.p.); meanwhile, countries 
with a stable or rising share of industrial production recorded improvements 
in their current account balances. This was particularly evident in the cases of 
Germany (+9 p.p.) and South Korea (+11 p.p.).
The high technological level and price competitiveness of German industry 
contributed to the stable development of the economy, low unemployment 
and balanced public finances, especially when the myth of lavish profits 
flowing from a self-propelling market of innovative financial instruments 
collapsed13. Service sectors such as finance and tourism often do not guar-
antee income in periods of global economic slowdown. The link between the 
rise in industrial production and the increase of the economy’s trading sur-
plus also results from the fact that 76% of turnover in international trade is 
generated by the trade in goods14. Services are still a type of product which 
is most often provided on the domestic market, which is why they play a less 
important role in international trade.
In the last decade, German industry has been supported by the situation on 
foreign markets. Rising incomes in emerging economies such as Brazil, Chi-
na, India and Russia have led these countries onto the path of industrialisa-
tion by increasing investments in infrastructure and production capacity. This 
has benefited the German engineering, chemical and electrical engineering 
13 ‘Germany’s economic model: What Germany offers the world’, The Economist, 14 April 2012, 
http://www.economist.com/node/21552567
14 Key Statistics and Trends in International Trade 2016, UNCTAD, http://unctad.org/en/Publica-
tionsLibrary/ditctab2016d3_en.pdf, p. 9.
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companies. The boom in commodity markets has also favoured companies 
from Germany which supply the machinery and technology necessary to in-
crease production15. Over time, the emerging economies have become richer 
and are beginning to develop strong middle and upper classes; consequently, 
demand on these emerging markets for the products of the German automotive 
sector has been rising. Moreover, the modernisation of the new EU countries, 
financed by the cohesion policy, guarantees Germany an attractive market to 
sell its investment goods.
Many German manufacturers of vehicles, machinery, tools and building 
materials have been gaining from the ongoing investments in the expansion 
of infrastructure and industry. In Germany there are strong links between 
the global corporations and the SME sector (including the so-called hidden 
champions). These links appear to be stable even in countries where the Ger-
man economy is trying to expand. When German industrial companies start-
ed to invest in China, they brought their suppliers from Germany onto the 
Chinese market. Meanwhile, their foreign activity was funded by the Ger-
man banks, which were able to offer a wide range of products well suited to 
the investors’ needs.
3. The German model of industrial policy
In recent years, the actions Germany has taken within the framework of its 
industrial policy have been appreciated in the most developed countries. The 
consequences of the global financial crisis shook the faith that deepening 
globalisation benefits all countries and sectors of the population to a similar 
extent16. It is increasingly rare to hear mainstream economists question the 
view that the state should interfere in individual sectors of the economy. Many 
of them justify its right to go beyond the role adopted in the liberal economic 
model, to take care of institutions and ensure macroeconomic stability17. An 
example of the implementation of industrial policy mechanisms in the most 
15 K. Popławski, Chasing globalisation. Germany’s economic relations with the BRIC countries. 
OSW Report, November 2013, https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/raport_05_bric_
ang.pdf
16 Meeting of the OECD Council at Ministerial Level in Paris, OECD 2017, https://www.oecd.
org/mcm/documents/C-MIN-2017-2-EN.pdf 
17 Cf. R. Wade, After The Crisis: Industrial Policy & the Developmental State, IMF 2010, https://
www.imf.org/external/np/seminars/eng/2010/lic/pdf/WadeE.pdf, ‘Commission calls for 
immediate action for a European Industrial Renaissance’, Europa.eu, 22 January 2014, http://
europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-42_en.htm 
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developed countries is the introduction of a variety of instruments to support 
innovation (start-ups) and the environment (renewable energy sources).
One of the more closely analysed models of industrial policy is the German 
model. During the post-war period Germany developed a number of unique 
solutions that laid the foundation for its economic success (for more on this 
subject see Appendix: Stages of development of industrial policy in Germany). 
The most important components of the German model include activity by the 
state, the strong position of the workers, and numerous privileges for SME en-
terprises.
The task of the German state’s industrial policy is to provide a predictable po-
litical programme, ensuring that social interests are taken into account in the 
country’s economic development, and promoting the international competi-
tiveness of German companies18. Representatives of the public administration 
conduct a continuous dialogue with business. In a ‘soft’ way, the state coordi-
nates the activities of companies, and seeks to act as a moderator in the discus-
sion on the development of the German economy, balancing the interests of the 
various parties. Angela Merkel, despite her busy political calendar, makes an 
effort every year to participate in important economic events, especially those 
that are considered important from the perspective of the strategy for econom-
ic development. Special mention should be made of the national summits con-
cerning future innovations, such as the national IT summits which have been 
held since 200619, the national education summits on mathematics, computer 
science, natural sciences and technology20, and the CEBIT fair in Hanover. 
By maintaining strong formal and informal relationships, the public insti-
tutions also receive feedback from the representatives of the companies and 
thanks to this they can monitor the risks for the economy more effectively: 
at the CEBIT in 2017, Merkel called for the preparation of a catalogue of busi-
ness’s expectations in matters concerning the regulation of the digital econ-
omy21. This dialogue is facilitated by the corporatist structure of the German 
18 The 2013 coalition agreement between the CDU/CSU and the SPD, https://www.cdu.de/sites/
default/files/media/dokumente/koalitionsvertrag.pdf, p. 18.
19 The National IT Summit, http://www.bmwi.de/DE/Themen/Digitale-Welt/nationaler-it-gip-
fel.html
20 Website of the National Forum of Education in Mathematics, Computer Science, Engineer-
ing and Natural Sciences, http://www.nationalesmintforum.de/
21 B. Gillmann, ‘Merkel bittet Industrie um Hilfe’, Handelsblatt, 13 April 2017, p. 12.
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economy, in which the activities of companies are coordinated through a net-
work of business associations. Because these organisations are grouped in hi-
erarchical structures, they are treated by the government as the ‘voices’ of spe-
cific industries with clearly identified needs.
Another important element of Germany’s industrial policy was the creation of 
a stable model of relations between employees and employers in the social mar-
ket economy. Under the principle of workers’ participation in decision making 
(Mitbestimmung), their representatives were granted the right to sit on the su-
pervisory boards of the companies22. Works councils, consisting of employees’ 
representatives, must be consulted on issues related to changes in employment 
and social affairs. The strong position of German workers means that German 
companies, even those with a global reach, must give priority to the interests 
of their plants located in Germany, even at the expense of their foreign affili-
ates. Research shows that this principle of co-decision points the companies 
towards making long-term profits, something which has prompted the Brit-
ish government, among others, to consider the possibility of implementing the 
German solutions in this field23.
One particular feature of the German system is the creation for workers of 
a path by which they can simultaneously pursue theoretical education while 
learning practical skills in companies (duale Ausbildung) straight after they fin-
ish their basic education. This entitles the worker to sit a master’s exam, and to 
obtain significantly higher qualifications and earnings. Moreover in Germany 
social benefits, including a fixed income, are guaranteed during the search for 
a new job, which favours the education of workers with high qualifications, 
even in very narrow professional niches. 
Another characteristic feature of German industrial policy is that it is not tar-
geted at large corporations alone. Germany early recognised the importance of 
the SME sector for the economy, and support for it has become one of the pri-
orities of industrial policy. Policymakers have realised that the development of 
22 Pursuant to the law on the organisation of businesses, all companies employing over 
500 people, with the exception of family businesses, were obliged to allocate one third of 
the seats on their supervisory boards to representatives of employees or works councils. 
Lower limits were set for smaller companies. The act is still in force today in a slightly dif-
ferent form (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz of 11 October 1952).
23 N. Röper, ‘Arbeitnehmer, die mitbestimmen, sind gut für die Wirtschaft’, Die Zeit, 19 Janu-
ary 2017, http://www.zeit.de/karriere/2017-01/mitbestimmungsrecht-gewerkschaften-eu-
gh-arbeitgeber-urteil-arbeitnehmer 
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the German economy may be hindered by problems with expanding the SME 
sector on foreign markets due to smaller capital resources, difficulties with the 
application of new technologies and management methods, and unfavourable 
political climate abroad, particularly on the markets of developing countries. 
The state’s institutions see their role as offering political support to German 
companies, as well as in the creation of instruments to reduce the barriers pro-
tecting foreign markets.
In the face of increased competition on these markets, the state sees its task as 
promoting new technologies and management practices among the SMEs. For 
example, the German state institutions make efforts to inform the SME sec-
tor about the risks of the leakage or theft of technology caused by inadequate 
protection of sensitive data. Another important role is played by the policy of 
financing the SME sector from regional banks belonging to the federal state 
authorities (Landesbanken). Close cooperation allows financial institutions to 
offer financial products tailored to the needs of the SMEs. If the risks associ-
ated with the international expansion of companies become too high from the 
Landesbanken point of view, companies can apply for export and investment 
guarantees which are subsidised by the state.
table 1. Components of industrial policy
Market industrial policy
Sectoral industrial policy
Subsidies for unprofitable 
industries
Periodic support for indus-
tries to assist their adapta-
tion to market conditions 
or structural challenges
Creating conditions for 
the development of new 
industries
Selective support for re-
search and development
source: Author’s work, based on B. Rakow, Ökologische Industriepolitik in Deutschland und Europa: 
Eine Analyze des volkswirtschaftliche Konzeptes, Peter Lang, Frankfurt 2013, p. 87
The current industrial policy in Germany can be considered as an interme-
diate point between the liberal British model and the statist French model24. 
24 Two models of industrial policy can be distinguished. One involves the creation of instru-
ments of support for the economy as a whole, without distinguishing between the different 
sectors, which can be considered close to the British vision, as sanctioned by the Margaret 
Thatcher government. In that time, ambitious plans were carried out for the privatisation 
of many state-owned enterprises, including the railways, and subsidies for heavy industry 
were reduced. Another model of support is the sectoral industrial policy based on subsidis-
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Germany prefers a horizontal approach, focusing on the development of in-
struments of support which are available to all sectors, through such measures 
as reducing taxation, making the labour market more flexible, and reducing 
the bureaucratic burden25. In Germany, there is a perception that subsidising 
unprofitable industries is most commonly linked (directly or indirectly) to the 
use of protectionist measures, which raises concerns in other countries that 
tension in international trade will be generated. Also at the EU level, Germany 
has (next to the UK) been a staunch supporter of liberalising markets and re-
ducing protectionism. Germany has also thus been sceptical of industrial poli-
cy, because it could limit the room for German exporters to expand.
Germany allows the use of certain elements of sectoral industrial policies, 
such as restructuring sectors with problems (for more on this see Chapter IV, 
p. 2), supporting research and development in some industries (see Chapter 
IV, p. 3), and facilitating the development of new sectors, such as renewable 
energy sources (see Chapter IV, p. 4).
ing unprofitable industries, helping them to adapt, and fostering innovation to improve in-
dividual industries. This approach is close to the French model, which is characterised by 
the implementation of large projects and the creation of national champions, as well as the 
use of instruments to protect specific sectors.
25 K. Aiginger, ‘Industrial Policy for a sustainable growth path’, Policy Paper, no. 13, https://
www.oecd.org/eco/Industrial-Policy-for-a-sustainable-growth-path.pdf, pp. 7–8.
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ii. indusTrial policy 4.0
The trend of digitisation, which is one of the essential elements of the Fourth 
Industrial Revolution, presents not only opportunities but also many risks for 
the German economy. The role of the state’s institutions is to prepare a response 
to the challenges of technological innovations, and this is why they have been 
developing the Industry 4.0 concept. Its main objectives include activities in 
four areas: digitisation, innovation, education and the international stage.
1. Germany’s problems with the Fourth industrial revolution
From Germany’s perspective, the Fourth Industrial Revolution raises three chal-
lenges. Firstly, German producers must be able to abandon their existing busi-
ness models and join the pioneers of change. Only in this way will they be able to 
respond flexibly and quickly to market changes, including the emergence of com-
pletely new competitors on their markets. Second, manufacturers of machinery 
and equipment, especially SMEs, need to focus on increasing their competence 
in producing software and acquiring the skills of equipping their products with 
digital technologies, and also to gain access to the appropriate IT infrastructure 
and the necessary data. Thirdly, Germany must defend itself against domination 
by the foreign manufacturers of software used in German products, which will 
reduce the value added achieved by German manufacturers. The development of 
Industry 4.0 in Germany may be hindered by the problem of digital sovereignty. 
This term is used in Germany to define the great extent to which German com-
panies are dependent on foreign suppliers of the software which is essential in 
the production of machines capable of intercommunication. The challenge for 
German companies is to master the ability to create software with high utility 
values, so they do not become dependent on external software developers which 
could become serious competitors over time.
The German state, as it realises the scale of the challenge, is seeking ways 
to adapt its domestic industry to the transforming global economy. Public 
institutions want to ensure coordination between enterprises, research in-
stitutes and workers’ & social organisations to adapt the German economy 
to the fourth industrial revolution. The intention is for Germany to become 
a country that offers cutting-edge digital services to its citizens via a modern 
infrastructure for data transmission, as well as a state which is not merely 
a subject of these changes, but also an active initiator and co-creator of them. 
The state’s institutions want to manage the processes of modernising indus-
try in such a way that they do not undermine the foundations of the social 
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market economy, and that the internet does not become an area which lies 
outside the writ of German law.
Since 2013 the German government has been developing the concept of Indus-
try 4.0, which is a response to the opportunities and risks associated with the 
Fourth Industrial Revolution. Germany sees its best opportunities for expan-
sion in the areas of  automation, information technology, and the digitisation of 
industrial production processes. The advantages of Industry 4.0 may include 
an increase in the capacity and efficiency of factories, an expanded range of 
products and services, and the creation of entirely new business models26. The 
intention is for German manufacturers to specialise in providing customers 
with advanced and comprehensive solutions, and not just individual products. 
Thus, companies from Germany will be able not only to provide buses or sub-
way cars for cities, but also to sell whole systems to improve mobility, along 
with entire ranges of German products. Making this possible will require close 
coordination among German companies, in order to develop common tech-
nology standards which will make it possible to design equipment operating 
within a single system.
One of the most important goals of the German government in the Industry 
4.0 project is to coordinate the work of large enterprises and SMEs, thus cre-
ating a platform to bring the interested parties together, increase the fund-
ing opportunities for related initiatives, and develop regulations allowing 
the development of new innovative products and services. Many public in-
stitutions have been conducting research to identify the opportunities and 
risks associated with the development of Industry 4.0. These reports often 
discuss specific issues, including the state of research in this field27, pros-
pects for developing the education of employees in SMEs28, and the develop-
ment of Industry 4.0 in a global context29. This knowledge should enable them 
26 W. Wahlster (ed.), Industrie 4.0 im globalen Kontext: Strategien der Zusammenarbeit mit inter-
nationalen Partnern, Munich 2016, p. 20. 
27 Forschungsagenda Industrie 4.0 – Aktualisierung des Forschungsbedarfs, Federal Ministry of Econ-
omy and Energy, 2016, https://www.plattform-i40.de/I40/Navigation/DE/Home/home.html
28 Industrie 4.0-Wegweiser zur Qualifizierung und Weiterbildung für kleine und mittelständische 
Unternehmen, Federal Ministry of Economy and Energy, 2016, http://www.plattform-
i40.de/I40/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/Publikation/wegweiser-qualifizierung.pdf?__
blob=publicationFile&v=3
29 H. Kagermann, R. Anderl, J. Gausemeier, G. Schuh, W. Wahlster, ACATECH Studie: Industrie 4.0 
im globalen Kontext: Strategien der Zusammenarbeit mit internationalen Partnern, 2016, http://
www.plattform-i40.de/I40/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/Publikation/industrie-40-im-
globalen-kontext.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
26
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 0
4/
20
19
to make informed choices about the path of future development. The Ger-
man government has also focused on creating a platform connecting actors 
with the potential to jointly shape Industry 4.0, in particular representatives 
of businesses, trade unions and science. Cooperation between these groups 
should allow the development of new standards and certificates, intensify 
research, improve digital security, and help with the proposals of new regu-
lations for the development of digitisation.
2. supporting digitisation
In the current conditions of the dynamic development of new technologies, one 
prerequisite for maintaining the high competitiveness of the German economy 
is its comprehensive digitisation. Chancellor Angela Merkel has stressed in 
her speeches that “data will be the raw material of the twenty-first century”30. 
Hence, the ability to use and rapidly process data will be decisive for the 
country’s position in international economic relations. Digitisation may pose 
a threat to Germany’s existing model of the social market economy. US compa-
nies currently control 89% of the global search-engine market, 98% of the op-
erating systems for smartphones, 89% of distribution channels for mobile ap-
plications, 43% of the online messaging market, and generate 90% of revenues 
from e-commerce31. At the same time, the largest internet companies are using 
their current position to enter additional market segments such as transporta-
tion, medical services, paying bills and online shopping.
Germany has its advantages regarding competition with other highly devel-
oped countries in the field of digitisation: a large domestic market and good 
conditions for access to foreign markets, high demand for IT products, a rel-
atively high level of innovation among its traditional industries, as well as 
effective cooperation between the IT sector and other branches32. German 
companies recognise that digitisation is becoming a major priority for the gov-
ernment. According to an analysis by Germany’s digital association Bitkom, the 
30 ‘Merkel: Rohstoffe sind die Daten des 21. Jahrhunderts’, FAZ, 3 December 2016, http://www.
faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/cebit/vor-der-cebit-merkel-daten-sind-die-rohstoffe-des-21-Jah-
rhunderts-14120493.html 
31 R. Berger, Fair Play in der digitalen Welt. Wie Europa für Plattformen den richtigen Rahmen setzt, 
15 October 2016, https://www.rolandberger.com/de/Publications/pub_fair_play_in_the_
digital_arena.html, pp. 17 and 47.
32 ‘Merkel: Daten sind die Rohstoffe des 21. Jahrhunderts’, FAZ, 12.03.2016, https://www.faz.
net/aktuell/wirtschaft/cebit/vor-der-cebit-merkel-daten-sind-die-rohstoffe-des-21-jahr-
hunderts-14120493.html
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government implemented 80% of its digitisation plan in the period 2013–2017. 
Particular achievements in recent times have included the introduction of 
a law on access to data (Open Data), improvements to digital security, and the 
establishment of 11 centres for digital skills, which are intended to support 
small- and medium-sized enterprises in the process of digitisation.
Despite this progress, however, Germany is clearly behind the world lead-
ers in many areas of digitisation. Currently Germany ranks only 28th among 
OECD countries in terms of the availability of a fibre optic network for its 
citizens. According to the EC, Germany is 20th in the EU in terms of offer-
ing e-government services and, according to the ranking by the Global Open 
Data Index, it is only 27th in the world in terms of sharing public data for com-
mercial purposes.
Some of these deficits are due to negligence and a lack of coordination between 
public institutions. The business community emphasises that the state is being 
held back by the federal state structure in accelerating the digitisation pro-
cess, because there is a high level of reluctance to cooperate between the mu-
nicipalities, the Bundesländer and the federation, as well as disputes between 
ministries over competences33. The situation is not being made any easier by 
the problems with coordinating the government’s work in this field. In recent 
years, responsibility for digitisation has been divided among different minis-
tries, with the vast majority of competences being assigned to the Federal Min-
istry of Transport, which was not prepared for these tasks. The new coalition 
has not listened to appeals from the business community to create a separate 
Federal Ministry of Digitisation. Although the structure for coordinating is-
sues related to digitisation has been ineffective, however, additional decision-
making units have been created. Shortly after the swearing-in of the govern-
ment in March 2018, a post of Secretary of State for Digitisation was established 
as part of the Chancellor’s Office, which was filled by Dorothee Bär (CSU). But 
Chancellor Merkel did not want to transfer control of that area to the CSU, and 
a month later she created a department for political planning, innovation and 
digital policy within the Federal Chancellery, which she entrusted to one of 
her closest collaborators, Eva Christiansen34.
33 D. Heide, Ch. Kerkmann, ‘Die verpasste Chance’, Handelsblatt, 14 June 2017, p. 18.
34 M. Hecking, ‘Diese Frau entscheidet über Deutschlands digitale Zukunft’, Manager Maga-
zine, 26 April 2018, http://www.manager-magazin.de/politik/deutschland/merkel-vertra-
ute-eva-christiansen-leitet-digitalressort-a-1204765.html 
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
28
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 0
4/
20
19
The government’s main objectives for its digitisation policy include:
 – guaranteeing access to broadband internet with a capacity of at least 
50 Mbit/s (this is a big challenge, considering that currently the average 
transfer rate in Germany is only 10.7 Mbit/s);
 – subsidising the development of the internet in structurally weak regions;
 – supporting small- and medium-sized ICT-sector companies in their foreign 
expansion;
 – creating competence centres to deal with the promotion of new companies, 
technologies and best practices in the IT field;
 – increasing the number of start-ups from 10,000 to 15,000 annually, and 
offering them access to capital in order to finance riskier projects;
 – protecting new innovative companies from the monopolistic practices of 
the dominant internet companies;
 – supporting the use of new IT technologies in the development of energy 
networks, in particular introducing renewable energy sources and im-
proving the energy efficiency of the economy;
 – more emphasis on the development of e-government, and making it inde-
pendent of the IT tools developed by global corporations;
 – increasing the security of communication used by state bodies;
 – extending the scope of access to scientific publications on the internet;
 – becoming involved in changing EU rules in such a way that the protection of per-
sonal data adequately defends the rights of German citizens and the competitive-
ness of German companies which store significant amounts of sensitive data online;
 – combatting cybercrime which results in economic losses and threats to 
personal freedom35.
A major challenge for the German government is encouraging traditional in-
dustrial firms and the IT industry to cooperate in developing joint products. 
This is necessary because the greatest opportunities for an innovative German 
economy are opening up in areas such as the production of self-driving vehi-
cles, the so-called internet of things, new sales channels, logistics, and Indus-
try 4.036, all of which require expertise from both areas. 
35 Digitale Agenda 2014–2017, the Federal Ministry of Economy and Energy, August 2014, 
https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/EN/Downloads/digital-agenda-2014-2017.pdf?__
blob=publicationFile&v=1
36 Digitale Strategies 2025 the Federal Ministry of Economy and Energy, March 2016, http://
www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Redaktion/PDF/Publikationen/digitale-strategie-2025,property=pdf
,bereich=bmwi2012,sprache=de,rwb=true.pdf, p. 8.
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Other barriers to the digitisation process include the resistance of small- and 
medium-sized enterprises to the implementation of new technologies, and the 
low level of security of the data stored. Many SMEs do not have sufficient re-
sources and skills to protect themselves against industrial espionage or hacker 
attacks, meaning that German technology is leaked to foreign competitors37. The 
German government has been subsidising projects to raise the IT level of those 
industries which are least advanced in this respect, such as craft businesses.
The government is currently setting targets and coordinating cooperation be-
tween the political, economic, scientific and social spheres. One example of this 
is the organisation of round-table meetings between representatives of the na-
tional government, the Bundesländer, the municipalities and telecom operators 
to develop the best procedures for expanding the national fibre-optic infra-
structure. To increase the potential of German companies, the government has 
adopted a law on open access to data (Open-Data-Gesetz), which is intended to 
make the data resources collected by the German public administration freely 
available for commercial use38. This is aimed at enabling the creation of a mar-
ket valued at up to €131 billion; the benefits may include better traffic manage-
ment, the prevention of traffic jams, and the reduction of energy consumption.
The German government faces the challenge of how to devise regulations for 
the digital market which would protect German companies from the domi-
nance of non-European IT companies, while not blocking opportunities for 
new business models to develop39. Greater powers to detect abuses are to be 
given to the Office for Cartels, whose intended function is to ensure that Ger-
man law on the internet is respected. The SPD and the Greens have already 
submitted formal requests for the government to examine the activities of in-
ternet service platforms such as Uber and AirBnB in terms of their compliance 
with the law40. 
The Federal Ministry of Economy and Energy is implementing provisions ex-
tending the definition of the market in German law to include areas not direct-
ly related to trading by means of payment in order for its antitrust regulations 
to be able to cover search engines, especially Google. The Ministry of Justice 
37 W. Wahlster (ed.), Industrie 4.0 globalen them Kontext, op. cit., p. 21.
38 D. Heide, D. Neuerer, ‘Staat will Daten vergolden’, Handelsblatt, 17 November 2016, p. 6. 
39 D. Heide, ‘Mehr Transparenz in der virtuellen Welt’, Handelsblatt, 20 March 2017, p. 9.
40 D. Heide, ‘Digitalisierung: Regeln für das Tauschgeschäft’, Handelsblatt, 18 January 2017, p. 8.
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has also drawn attention to the monopoly position of some IT companies on the 
online search market, which the European Commission is to examine in terms 
of antitrust law41. The Minister of Justice has introduced a bill requiring social 
networking sites to remove false information or posts disseminating hatred 
within 24 hours of notification under a penalty of €50 million for corporations 
and up to €5 million euros for the employees responsible42. The official justifi-
cation for this move was to discipline social networking sites into improving 
their filtering processes before the elections to the Bundestag. However, it has 
also been pointed out that, for example, Facebook has a dominant position on 
the online advertising market in Germany, which has hit German press titles 
trying to move their business online.
The position of the government, which is trying to implement the law conducive 
to technological progress, has often been met with scepticism or reluctance by 
German consumers. In 2017 the Federal Infrastructure Ministry proposed the 
establishment of a law under which users would be responsible for accidents 
involving self-driving cars, despite the fact that 73% of Germans have stated 
that the blame for such situations should be borne by the software’s creator43. 
Meeting the will of the people, however, would hamper the development of 
this technology, which will be vital for the German automotive industry.
3. stimulating entrepreneurship and innovation
The demographic crisis is increasingly restricting entrepreneurship in Germa-
ny, which could jeopardise the international position of the German economy in 
the future. Already, the number of newly established companies is decreasing, 
and many business owners, even those with an established market position, are 
having difficulty finding successors. In recent years, Germany has been strug-
gling with the problem of more companies being closed than being established, 
due to factors including the demographic crisis. Almost half of new companies 
(in recent years this figure has fallen within the range of 44 to 47%) are being 
founded by people of immigrant origin. At the same time, the number of Ger-
man companies being dissolved in 2012–2015 exceeded the number of businesses 
41 ‘Facebook in Haftung nehmen’, Handelsblatt, 5 October 2016, pp. 4–5.
42 G. Chazan, ‘Germany cracks down on social media over fake news’, Financial Times, https://
www.ft.com/content/c10aa4f8-08a5-11e7-97d1-5e720a26771b
43 D. Neuerer, ‘Deutsche wollen Autobauer haftbar machen’, Handelsblatt, 15 February 2017, 
http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/unfaelle-mit-autopilot-deutsche-wol-
len-autobauer-haftbar-machen/19394210.html
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being founded by an average of 26,000 annually (about 0.7% of all companies). 
Yet this trend does not stop Germany from having the right conditions for busi-
ness: a good infrastructure, a vast scope of protections for intellectual property 
rights, and the ability to obtain significant public funds and advisers to help set 
up businesses. Indeed, one of the factors which discourage the establishment of 
new companies is the favourable situation on the German labour market.
The government is trying various programmes to improve conditions for busi-
ness in Germany. Its priorities in this area are:
 – increasing the number of business start-ups and facilitating the financing 
of their investments;
 – raising companies’ technological levels;
 – increasing opportunities for skilled workers to immigrate;
 – guaranteeing stable legal frameworks for companies;
 – supporting the development of small- and medium-sized enterprises;
 – improving levels of education.
Chancellor Merkel has stressed that Germany has a lot of catching up to do in 
creating favourable conditions for the formation of start-ups, not only in com-
parison with the US, but also with Britain and France44. Many young entrepre-
neurs from Germany complain that the opportunities for raising capital for 
risky initiatives are much fewer than in the United States. Without progress in 
this area, many German innovators may decide to implement their ideas in the 
US. Although Berlin is considered the unofficial capital of European start-ups, 
in 2016 this type of company gathered much more money from the market for 
their activities in London and Paris45. In Germany around €3.1 billion was in-
vested in such initiatives in 2015, while in the US in the same period the figure 
was €24.6 billion46. Almost a third of founders of start-ups in Germany would be 
willing to set up a new company in the United States, mainly due to the better 
financing conditions. Among the 146 global start-ups worth over US$1 billion, 
only seven are located in Germany. Representatives of such companies genu-
inely appreciate the conditions for obtaining capital in Germany for their start-
ups; however, they have problems getting the funding to continue development. 
Currently, the annual shortfall is estimated at €500–600 million euros per year, 
44 B. Gillmann, ‘Merkel bittet Industrie um Hilfe’, Handelsblatt, 13 April 2017, p. 12.
45 ‘London und Paris überholen Berlin’, NTV, 1 February 2017, https://www.n-tv.de/wirtschaft/
London-und-Paris-ueberholen-Berlin-article19681373.html
46 D. Heide, ‘Der Traum vom deutschen Google’, Handelsblatt, 14 October 2016, p. 8.
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and in 2015–2016 annual investments in start-ups in Germany fell from €3.6 bil-
lion to €1.9 billion47. The government’s KfW bank is trying to compensate for 
this problem; from 2020 it will raise its annual amount of support for start-ups 
from €100m to €200m. Additional support to the tune of €500 million will also 
be provided by the European Investment Fund. Moreover, the government has 
also introduced the option for owners of start-ups of tax deductions from the 
losses associated with their previous projects. A slightly different form of sup-
port is the INVEST Fund, created in 2017 by the Federal Ministry of Economy 
and Energy. It has at its disposal €300 million, from which investors can get 
grants for investment (up to 20% of its value) in high-innovation companies. 
In addition, tax on the sale of shares in high-innovation companies has been 
reduced.
An important goal for the government is to increase the innovativeness of 
small- and medium-sized enterprises, enabling them to strengthen their mar-
ket position and increase employment. One of the key support programmes is 
KMU-Innovativ48, implemented by the Federal Ministry of Education and Re-
search, which aims to support SMEs in the fields of biotech, medicine, infor-
mation and communications, research materials, photonics, production tech-
nology, resource efficiency, climate protection and civil security. Companies 
can count on assistance with consultation as well as financial grants. Since 
2007, this programme has supported 2500 companies to the tune of €1 billion. 
Meanwhile, the Central Innovation Programme for SMEs (Zentrales Innova-
tionsprogramm-Mittelstand) is a project of the Federal Ministry of Economy 
and Energy aimed at supporting innovation and competitiveness in small- and 
medium-sized enterprises49 and their research units50. In this framework, one 
can apply for support for individual projects aimed at improving innovation51, 
47 M. Greive, ‘Milliardenregen für die Gründer’, Handelsblatt, 12 June 2017, http://www.han-
delsblatt.com/finanzen/banken-versicherungen/start-up-foerderung-milliardenregen-
fuer-die-gruender/v_premium_not_allowed/19921630.html 
48 KMU-Innovativ für Vorfahrt Spitzenforschung im Mittelstand, Federal Ministry of Education and 
Research, Berlin 2016, https://www.bmbf.de/pub/KMU_innovativ_Spitzenforschung.pdf 
49 The SME sector is defined as companies employing up to 500 employees, with a turnover of 
€50 million and total assets of €43 million. 
50 Impulse für Innovationen Zentrales Innovationsprogramm Mittelstand, Federal Ministry of 
Economy and Energy, 2015, https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Publikationen/Mittel-
stand/zentrales-innovationsprogramm-mittelstand-zim.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=18
51 These research projects must meet several criteria: their aim is to develop new products and 
services that exceed the level of technical solutions currently on the market; they must dis-
play significant, but predictable technical risks; they must create new market opportuni-
ties and jobs; and they must be impossible to finance without the help of the programme.
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cooperation in implementing projects, or creating cooperation networks. One 
important advantage of this programme is that it reduces the formalities and 
bureaucratic procedures to a minimum, and examines each application within 
a two-month period. The total amount of support provided is around €350 mil-
lion per year.
The German government is also taking action to limit the decline in the num-
ber of companies in Germany. Within the EXIST programme, higher education 
facilities can obtain resources to support students in the process of establish-
ing companies, fund promising ventures, and provide the means to conduct 
conceptual work on new business projects (50–75% of the consultancy costs). 
Likewise, the German Accelerator programme allows students and gradu-
ates to establish companies in the IT sector, and supports them in their first 
years on the market. Also of interest are the activities of German institutions 
which lend assistance to business owners searching for successors. To do this, 
a special web platform has been set up wherein retiring business owners can 
search for successors. 12,000 companies have been assisted in this way. Anoth-
er example was provided by the activities of the NRW-Invest agency in North 
Rhine-Westphalia, which has opened an office in Poland aimed at searching for 
successors to take over German companies.
4. raising the level of education
Improving education is one of the key conditions for adapting to the Fourth 
Industrial Revolution. In its strategic documents the German government has 
been increasingly emphasising that in a globalised world competition between 
education systems will increase, and their quality will determine the econom-
ic future. Highly developed countries will find it difficult to maintain their po-
sition due to the rising levels of education and science in developing countries. 
Meanwhile, workers in Germany will find it difficult to compete in the world 
of the digital economy without proper training, especially since many small- 
and medium-sized companies are unwilling to increase the scope of their use 
of digital technologies. German entrepreneurs are also accustomed to existing 
rules governing how industries function, and may not have the skills to master 
new industrial technologies. In the face of these challenges, the government 
has been focusing on supporting the construction of networks and clusters of 
innovation, creating instruments facilitating collaboration between research 
industries and industrial services (such as transport and logistics), building 
up innovation partnerships (by bringing together representatives of manage-
ment, unions, science and education, and the public), and initiating the process 
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of creating innovation through platforms (such as the National Platform for 
Electro-Mobility)52.
Since coming to power Chancellor Merkel has laid great emphasis on increas-
ing spending on education and science. The budget of the ministry responsible 
for these areas grew by leaps and bounds in the period 2005–2017, by almost 
142% up to €17 billion, despite the fact that Germany reduced its overall budget 
expenditure during this period. In 2006–2017, the higher educational estab-
lishments considered to be the most promising could count on financing to the 
tune of €4.6 billion. This funding served three purposes: supporting young 
researchers, creating a network of units undertaking the highest-quality re-
search, and the development of research at German universities. The govern-
ment set a requirement that the results of research financed by the Federal 
Ministry of Education and Research should be shared on the open-access prin-
ciple.53 Scientists were also guaranteed the right to re-publish their work on 
the open-access principle within 12 months of its first publication (regardless 
of any prior agreement with the publishing house), if the research was at least 
50% financed from public funds.
Germany does not have such attractive tax incentives for investment in science 
as some other highly developed economies. In particular small countries, such 
as Ireland and the Netherlands, have a system of tax exemptions which attract 
companies investing in research to them. Germany has often criticised these 
measures as a manifestation of aggressive tax competition, and is involved in 
working out a common definition of the tax base in the OECD in order to pre-
vent abuses in this area, as well as the leakage of fiscal revenues from Germa-
ny. These attempts have ended in failure. The US has already implemented (and 
the United Kingdom is considering) the introduction of significant tax reduc-
tions for companies investing in research, which will exacerbate tax competi-
tion.54 However, a potential side-effect of this solution may be the creation of 
new loopholes for global corporations to commit tax fraud.
52 Die neue Hightech-Strategie für Deutschland Innovations, Federal Ministry of Education and 
Research, Berlin 2014, https://www.bmbf.de/pub_hts/HTS_Broschure_Web.pdf, p. 5.
53 Open Access in Deutschland: Die Strategie des Bundesministeriums für Bildung und Forschung, Fed-
eral Ministry of Education and Research, Berlin 2016, https://www.bmbf.de/pub/Open_Ac-
cess_in_Deutschland.pdf
54 M. Greive, J. Hildebrand, ‘Schäuble gibt Widerstand auf ’, Handelsblatt, 2 May 2017, p. 12.
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An important role in raising the level of education is played by subsidising less 
privileged students. The federal government took full responsibility from the 
regional authorities for financing scholarships, which around 110,000 stu-
dents received in 2016. Depending on their financial situation and stage of edu-
cation, they can count on amounts of between €200 and €735 monthly support. 
The grant may also take the form of a partial exemption from tuition fees or an 
interest-free loan. The scholarships are open to persons who have not reached 
the age of 35: the aid may be granted not only to German citizens, but also to 
foreigners who are likely to remain in the country55. The German authori-
ties also attach much importance to improving the students’ social situation, 
which is aided by regular increases to scholarships, raising the thresholds for 
entitlement to scholarships, increasing social support for families, raising the 
tax-free threshold, expanding the opportunities of scholarships for foreigners, 
and simplifying procedures for applying for scholarships. Another important 
role in facilitating learning involves offering a greater range of childcare for 
the parents of young children56. 
5. shaping the international legal framework
For years, the most important instrument for implementing German indus-
trial policy in the field of international relations has been shaping the Europe-
an legal framework in order to best suit the needs of German industry. In the 
1960s, Germany was interested in liberalising the trade in industrial products 
within the European Economic Community in order to reduce barriers to the 
sale of its products on the markets of less competitive countries. In the 1970s, 
a period of significant currency fluctuations, German politicians brought 
about the establishment of the European Monetary System, which guaran-
teed the stability of the Deutsche Mark (German Mark) in trading with the 
countries of the European Economic Community. In the 1980s, Germany was 
one of the main advocates of abolishing non-tariff barriers, which hampered 
55 K. Dienelt, BAföfG für Ausländer mit dauerhafter Bleibeperspektive in Deutschland, https://www.
migrationsrecht.net/nachrichten-auslaenderrecht-politik-gesetzgebung/791-bafmigration-
integration-ausler-bleiberecht-22-bafovelle.html
56 In its last few terms, the federal government has significantly supported the regions in con-
structing kindergartens and funding their operations. In the period 2008–2015, the num-
ber of places available for children aged 1-3 increased from 360,000 to 660,000, for rea-
sons including the development of crèches. In addition, since 2013 parents of children aged 
12 months or more have the right to obtain childcare; this was a way of putting pressure on 
the Bundesländer to increase funding to broaden the preschool offer. Another flagship pro-
ject is the creation of 24-hour kindergartens, which will be particularly helpful for people 
working night shifts.
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the development of trade within the EEC. The 1990s were a period when the 
German government was focused on developing the most favourable condi-
tions for the functioning of the eurozone. The creation of a monetary union 
limited other countries’ room to devalue their exchange rates to rebuild their 
competitiveness. After 2010, in the face of the euro crisis, Germany was able 
to push through an austerity policy which helped to limit the losses of German 
banks, whose portfolios contained valuable bonds from the monetary union’s 
southern states. In addition, this offset the risk of burdening German taxpay-
ers with the cost of bailing out those countries most affected by the conse-
quences of the eurozone crisis. 
Today Germany finds itself increasingly obliged to block changes in EU law to 
ensure that the new regulations do not weaken the institutions supporting its 
industry. One example of this was Germany’s position regarding the establish-
ment of a banking union57. The Berlin government agreed to the European Cen-
tral Bank’s supervision of banking institutions in the eurozone, provided that 
the German Landesbanken were excluded from this supervision58. Although 
they experienced numerous problems during the global financial crisis, and 
many of them had to be recapitalised with public funds, in Germany the opin-
ion prevailed that the Landesbanken were able to provide industry with flexi-
bility in financing their investments, thanks to their strong relationships with 
local businesses.
Another way in which the German government defended its industry from un-
favourable legislative changes in the EU was Berlin’s reactions to the European 
Commission’s 2017 proposal to introduce a package deregulating the services 
market in the EU. Brussels saw the German regulation that a condition for op-
erating a craft workshop is to have a master’s degree as an obstacle to deepen-
ing the integration of the common market. Chancellor Merkel announced her 
strong opposition to this proposal, seeing it as an attack on the German system 
of chambers of commerce and business associations, which provide high-qual-
ity services and professional educations59. The German government was also 
one of the first EU countries to introduce a minimum wage for truck drivers, 
57 K. Popławski, ‘The shape of the banking union confirms Berlin’s privileged position in the 
eurozone’, OSW Commentary, 10 January 2014, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-
commentary/2014-01-10/shape-banking-union-confirms-berlins-privileged-position
58 W. Schäuble, Umsetzung der Europäischen Bankenunion, 6 November 2014, http://www.wolf-
gang-schaeuble.de/umsetzung-der-europaeischen-bankenunion/
59 R. Berschens, T. Hoppe, F. Specht, ‘Kampf um den Meisterbrief’, Handelsblatt, 21 March 2017, p. 6.
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which was a manifestation of the fight against ‘social dumping’; aside from 
heeding public opinion, Berlin was also taking care to limit the expansion of 
transport companies from Central Europe. The EC criticised those activities as 
unlawful protectionism; however its actual, rather sluggish, reaction was lim-
ited primarily to holding talks with the government in Berlin60. Germany also 
received strong support from France after the election of President Emmanuel 
Macron. As a result, both countries have managed to push through restrictions 
in the provisions on posting workers between EU countries, which is likely to 
weaken the competitiveness from logistics and construction businesses from 
Central Europe.
The German government is increasingly involved in creating better conditions 
for the development of foreign trade, not only within Europe but also globally. 
Germany’s involvement in setting the highest possible environmental stand-
ards (in particular through the introduction of requirements to increase the 
share of renewable energy in the energy balance, and its participation in glob-
al climate conferences) is expected to improve conditions for export by Ger-
man companies in the fields of renewable energy and energy efficiency. Ger-
many was one of the founders of the International Renewable Energy Agency 
(IRENA), whose headquarters is located in Bonn61. In turn, one intended aim 
of the Transatlantic Partnership in the field of Trade and Investment was the 
liberalisation of trade, of which German industries would be one of the biggest 
beneficiaries62. 
In Germany it is increasingly clear that potential areas of  conflict with the US 
include regulatory issues within the field of digitisation, as well as disputes 
over the market share of American IT companies63. Therefore, an important 
task for the government is to strive to maintain its ‘digital sovereignty’, that is, 
the country’s ability to maintain freedom of movement and operation on the 
60 A. Meier, ‘Westeuropäer gegen Sozialdumping’, Tagesspiegel, 7 March 2017, http://www.ta-
gesspiegel.de/politik/eu-streit-um-speditionsunternehmen-westeuropaeer-gegen-sozial-
dumping/19480534.html
61 ‘Deutschland ratifiziert als erstes Land Gründungsvertrag von IRENA’, Federal Environ-
ment Ministry, https://www.bmu.de/pressemitteilung/deutschland-ratifiziert-als-erstes-
land-gruendungsvertrag-von-irena/
62 K. Popławski, ‘Germany's stance on the TTIP. Background, interests and concerns’, OSW 
Studies, 24 March 2015, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-studies/2015-03-24/
germanys-stance-ttip-background-interests-and-concerns
63 ‘In Spite of It All, America’, New York Times, 11 October 2017, https://www.nytimes.
com/2017/10/11/world/europe/germany-united-states-trump-manifesto.html
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
38
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 0
4/
20
19
internet. To achieve this, German citizens and institutions must be guaran-
teed the relevant powers to operate freely online and to a competitive market 
of internet providers, as well as the security of their data and their data trans-
mission devices. Germany is therefore committed to the creation of interna-
tional standards and regulations guaranteeing the preservation of digital sov-
ereignty. In collaboration with companies and institutions, the government 
has been developing new digital standards in Germany, and has since been 
trying to transpose them into EU legislation, as part of the Industry 4.0 project 
among others. The Federal Ministry of Economy and Energy gives grants for 
the development of German technologies in the fields of so-called cloud com-
puting, IT security and software development. Currently, it is also trying to 
establish new international standards regarding the security of data stored in 
the so-called cloud, as well as the legal framework for testing self-driving ve-
hicles. Another important objective for Germany is the further liberalisation 
of the EU digital market, which requires the free exchange of digital goods and 
services between member states, guaranteeing the appropriate procurement 
procedures in the field of  IT, as well as data security. The optimal scenario for 
Germany would be if the EU spent a greater portion of the funds available in 
the multiannual financial framework than it has done so far on the develop-
ment of digitalisation and IT technology, and funded the expansion of digital 
infrastructure in the member states.
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iii. how supporT For indusTry is orGanised
The two inseparable elements of industrial policy in Germany are the national 
innovation system and subsidies. Without the effectiveness of German institu-
tions in these fields, the success which German industry enjoys today would 
be impossible.
1. institutions responsible for implementing industrial policy
Despite difficulties in mastering the technology in the newest sectors of the 
economy, Germany is still one of the most innovative economies in the world in 
traditional sectors64. 90% of private sector expenditure on R&D is generated by 
industrial companies65. This is due largely to Germany’s rich traditions of sup-
porting industry through a system of institutions dealing with research and 
technical support for business. According to the OECD’s methodology, the Ger-
man innovation system is firm-centred, and its public research system is cen-
tred on public research institutions (as opposed to public research-centred in-
novation systems and higher-education institution-centred public research66). 
Figure 7. Sources of spending on R&D (in billions of euros)
State institutions €13 billion
Universities €17 billion
Businesses  €63 billion
source: Federal Ministry of Education and Scientific Research
Expenditure on research and development in Germany has been steadily ris-
ing, and in 2016 it amounted to €92 billion, of which business spent €63 billion, 
64 In the innovation index of the European Commission, Germany came seventh in 2016, http://
ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/innovation/facts-figures/scoreboards_en 
65 Germany as a Competitive Industrial Nation: Building on Strengths–Overcoming Weaknesses–
Securing the Future, Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, 2010, https://www.man-
ufacturing-policy.eng.cam.ac.uk/documents-folder/policies/germany-in-focus-germany-as-
a-competitive-industrial-nation-bmwi/at_download/file, p. 6.
66 OECD Reviews of Innovation Policy: Sweden 2016, p. 91.
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universities €17 billion, and the state €13 billion67. In 2014 603,900 people were 
employed in the R&D sector (out of 43.4 million workers in Germany); the num-
ber of employees in this sector has risen by 24% since 200068. Support for in-
novation is a competence of both the federal and the provincial governments. 
Funds are earmarked for the short-term financing of specific research projects 
carried out by public and private institutions, as well as for the long-term fi-
nancing of scientific and research institutions.
Figure 8. The German innovation system
Private
research
laboratories
Political system
Intermediaries
Industrial system
Research
and science system
Administration
German Foundation 
for Reserach (DFG)
Other institutions 
Foundations and 
associations for the 
promotion of German 
research 
Chambers and economic 
associations
(BDI, DIHK, etc.)
ERA
ERC
Federal ministries:
Federal Ministry for
Education and Scientiﬁc 
Research 
Federal Ministry
for Economy
and Energy  
Other ministries
Provincial Ministries
of Education and 
Scientiﬁc Research
Foreign companies
Multinationals
Large companies
Start-ups and spin-offs 
Small- and medium-sized 
companies
Universities and 
polytechnics
Non-university
research institutions
Public sector Sector R&D
Parliament:
Bundestag and 
Bundesrat
Governments
and parliaments of
16 Bundesländer
European Parliament
Scientiﬁc Council
(Ger. Wissenschaftsrat)
European Commission
Private foundations
(eg. Foundation VW)
Regional foundations
source: C. Hommes, A. Mattes, D. Triebe, Research and Innovation Policy in the US and Germany: A Compa-
rison, Berlin 2011; and New Challenges for Germany in the Innovation Competition–Final Report, Karlsruhe, 
Atlanta 2008
The German innovation system is based on three pillars (see Figure 8):
1. The public sector: legislative and executive institutions (ministries) at the 
federal and regional level decide on the funding and define the strategies 
and directions for the development of the German economy.
67 Forschung und Entwicklung, the Federal Statistical Office, https://www.destatis.de/DE/
Themen/Gesellschaft-Umwelt/Bildung-Forschung-Kultur/Bildungsfinanzen-Ausbildungs-
foerderung/Publikationen/Downloads-Bildungsfinanzen/bildungsausgaben-pdf-5217108.
pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=5
68 Forschung und Innovation: Die Trends 2016, Federal Ministry of Education and Scientific Re-
search, 6 January 2016, https://www.bmbf.de/de/deutschland-als-standort-fuer-forschung-
und-innovation-2016-2845.html
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2.  Intermediaries: A significant part of public funding for innovation is man-
aged by intermediaries, such as foundations or various types of government 
agencies. In addition, private foundations offer grants and funds for R&D.
3.  The sector implementing R&D consists of enterprises, universities, non-
university research institutions and state research institutions.
The most important institution coordinating expenditure on research and de-
velopment is the Federal Ministry of Education and Scientific Research. For 
its part, the Federal Ministry of Economy and Energy primarily supports in-
novation among small- and medium-sized enterprises, and the transfer of 
technology from science to business. In addition, it is responsible for creating 
favourable structural conditions for research and innovation, by means in-
cluding ensuring the supply of skilled labour, protecting intellectual property 
and financing the necessary technical infrastructure. For its part, the Federal 
Environment Ministry finances research projects on green technologies in the 
fields of  transport, construction, energy and environmental protection.
The German Länder shape innovation policy through both the activities of the 
Ministry of Education and Scientific Research and other channels. Regional 
spending on research and development accounts for about 40% of all public 
expenditure in this sector. The role of auxiliary bodies, such as the Scientific 
Council (Wissenschaftsrat) and the Expert Commission for Research and Inno-
vation (Expertenkommission Forschung und Innovation), is to make recommenda-
tions to the federal government and the Länder in matters of support for sci-
ence and innovation.
The European Union plays an increasingly important role in the German plan 
for supporting innovation, particularly in view of the fact that the EU has allo-
cated exceptionally large resources for research and innovation in its current 
budget planning. The European Commission co-finances research and devel-
opment primarily through the European Research Council (ERC). In the budget 
for 2014–2020, the ERC has around €12.8 billion available for all EU countries. 
In turn, the European Research Area (ERA) aims to raise the effectiveness of 
research systems within the EU and the level of research cooperation between 
member states.
The intermediary institutions are involved in the administration of public and 
private spending assigned to research and development. As a rule, these insti-
tutions operate on the basis of public law or through a registered association 
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(eingetragener Verein). At the federal level, the largest of these intermediary in-
stitutions are:
 – the German Foundation for Research (DFG, Deutsche Forschungsgemein-
schaft). This is an independent foundation which received €2.99 billion 
from the federal government in 2016. The DFG funds both research projects 
& scholarships, and investments in research infrastructure. The Founda-
tion funds research in all areas of science. In 2016, out of 14 areas of study, 
most funds were allocated for research in the field of medical sciences 
(around 25% of the budget).
 – the German Academic Exchange Service (Deutscher Akademischer Aus-
tauschdienst). This association is primarily engaged in financing interna-
tional scientific research exchanges and paying out scholarships.
 – chambers and business associations such as the Federal Association of 
German Industry (Bundesverband der deutschen Industrie) and the German 
Chamber of Industry and Commerce (Deutsche Industrie- und Handelskam-
mertag). This type of organisation offers its members financial support in 
applying for research grants, or cooperation in research and development, 
among other things. In addition to earmarking funds, they also offer know-
how and act as mediators between business and the R&D sector.
An important role in financing research and innovation is also played by foun-
dations which are financed or co-financed by individual companies. Some of 
them also receive money from the state budget. The largest of these are pre-
sented in the following table, together with their budgets and the areas of their 
research.
table 2. The largest German non-governmental organisations financing rese-
arch and innovation
name of foundation
annual spending 
on research and 
development
areas of research
Federation of Industrial 
Research Associations 
(Arbeitsgemeinschaft 
industrieller Forschungs-
vereinigungen)
€535 million
Instruments of support for all research 
with applications in the economy, from 
basic research to individual products and 
processes. In 2017 around 30% of its funds 
were earmarked to support industrial 
research, and 70% for research for SMEs.
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
43
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 0
4/
20
19
name of foundation
annual spending 
on research and 
development
areas of research
Volkswagen Foundation €150 million
The largest private foundation in Ger-
many, which provides support to research 
institutions and individual researchers 
from all fields of science.
Bosch Foundation €109 million
The Foundation supports activities in five 
key areas:
– education
– society 
– medicine
– international cooperation
– science (sustainable development, land 
management, women in science, coop-
eration among researchers).
Else Kröner-Fresenius 
Foundation
€46 million
Research projects in the field of medical 
science, and support for medical humani-
tarian projects.
Foundational Associa-
tion for German Science 
(Stifterverband für die 
deutsche Wissenschaft)
€30.5 million
Support in the areas of:
– education
– learning
– innovation.
Around 30% of the budget goes to scholar-
ships for professors.
Körber Foundation €18 million
Support in the following areas of research:
– demography and aging
– education (support for education in the 
field of MINT)
– communication
– culture
– science (financing conferences and 
awards)
– democracy
– history and politics
– foreign policy
source: Author’s own research
At the European level, German companies and institutions involved in re-
search and science may apply for European funds, either directly to the Eu-
ropean Commission, or by applying for funding for specific activities through 
intermediaries such as the European Research Council (ERC) or the European 
Research Area programme (ERA).
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One specifically German phenomenon is that of non-university research in-
stitutions, which consume a large part of R&D expenditure, and which also 
serve as the research base for German businesses, particularly smaller ones 
which do not maintain large R&D departments. In its report on organisations 
and institutions in the field of research and science, the Federal Ministry of 
Education and Scientific Research lists 636 such organisations69. The biggest of 
them are the Fraunhofer Society, the Max Planck Society, the Helmholtz As-
sociation of German Research Centres (Helmholtz-Gemeinschaft), and the Leib-
niz Association (Leibniz-Gemeinschaft). These non-university institutions often 
have offices and research centres outside Germany, most often in technically 
advanced countries like the US, Japan, South Korea, Israel and the Nordic coun-
tries. The Fraunhofer Society is the largest organisation for applied research in 
Europe, and the Helmholtz Association is the largest scientific organisation on 
the continent.
Table 3. Non-university research institutions in Germany
name 
of institution
number 
of employees*
annual 
budget* areas of research
Fraunhofer 
Society
25,300, of whom 
38% are academic 
staff and 27% are 
students and post-
graduates
€2.3 billion
Applied science. Research in five 
areas: health, safety, communica-
tion, mobility, energy and envi-
ronment, in 72 institutes.
Max Planck 
Society
22,900, of whom 61% 
are academics. 47% 
of its researchers 
are foreigners
€1.8 billion Basic research in 84 institutes. 
Helmholtz 
Association
38,700, of whom 
around 15,000 are 
employees and 
around 5000 are 
doctoral students
€4.5 billion
Technical and natural science, 
medical and biological sci-
ence. Research is conducted in 
a network of 18 independent 
research institutions, including 
the German Aerospace Centre, 
the German Electron Synchrotron 
(DESY) and the Institute of Tech-
nology at Karslruhe.
69 Bundesbericht Forschung und Innovation 2016–Ergänzungsband 2 Organisationen Einrichtungen 
und Forschung und Wissenschaft, Ministry of Education and Scientific Research, 2016, p. 4.
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name 
of institution
number 
of employees*
annual 
budget* areas of research
Leibniz 
Association
19,100
€1.93 
billion
Research in 5 areas: humanities, 
social and economic sciences, 
natural sciences, mathematics 
and engineering, environmental 
sciences.
* According to the latest available data. The oldest information comes from 2014
source: Bundesbericht Forschung und Innovation 2016–Ergänzungsband 2 Organisationen Einrichtungen und 
Forschung und Wissenschaft, Federal Ministry of Education and Scientific Research, Berlin 2016
Figure 9. Development of gross expenditure on science and research in Ger-
many, in millions of euros
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source: Federal Ministry of Education and Scientific Research, https://www.bmbf.de/de/deutschland-
als-standort-fuer-forschung-und-innovation-2016-2845.html
In 2013, public and government expenditure on science and research amounted 
to €79.7 billion, placing Germany first in this category in the EU. Preliminary es-
timates put the increase in spending on science in 2014 at €583.9 billion. Around 
70% of these funds (around €54 billion) go to private sector spending; the rest of 
the R&D expenditure goes to universities and public & private institutions. The 
number of people working in R&D is at its highest ever, and in 2014 amounted to 
603,000 persons. Since 2000 that number has risen by over 20%.
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Figure 10. Selected countries’ share in the global trade in research-intensive 
goods (percent)
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source: Federal Ministry of Education and Scientific Research, https://www.bmbf.de/de/deutschland-
als-standort-fuer-forschung-und-innovation-2016-2845.html
German companies have a big advantage over their EU competitors in terms 
of the global market share of research-intensive goods70. Since 2000, German 
companies have maintained a global market share of 12–13%, ahead of the US 
(around 12%), Japan (around 6%) and South Korea (around 5%). Only China has 
a better result in this indicator – a share of around 15% of the global market for 
research-intensive goods.
German efforts to support the R&D sector have had measurable effects. In the 
world ranking of the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI)71, Germany ranks 
fourth out of the 140 countries classified. This ranking examines the competi-
tiveness of economies based on 12 key indicators. Germany is sixth in the world 
in the rate of innovation.
70 According to the definition by the German Institute of Economy, research-intensive goods 
are industrial products on which during manufacturing companies spend between 2.5% to 
7% of their annual R&D expenditure. Around two-thirds of German exports are products of 
this type. Forschungsintensive Industrie, 1 June 2018, https://www.diw.de/de/diw_01.c.412447.
de/presse/diw_glossar/forschungsintensive_industrie.html 
71 World Economic Forum, http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-re-
port-2015-2016/competitiveness-rankings/ 
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2. The scope of subsidies within the framework of Germany’s 
industrial policy
An important role in German industrial policy is played by subsidies and tax 
breaks. Although Germany’s policy in this area has been the subject of strong 
criticism from the scientific community and non-governmental organisations, 
many private enterprises can still count on high levels of support from the 
state, even if they are in a good financial situation.
Figure 11. The value of subsidies in selected EU countries (% of GDP)
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source: Eurostat
Germany is at an average level, spending more on subsidies relative to GDP 
than do Poland or Slovakia, but less than the Czech Republic, France, Spain or 
Italy. In contrast to many countries, Germany has limited the scope of subsi-
dies it provides in recent years. As a result, German expenditure in support 
of business is lower than in many other developed countries. This was caused 
by the country’s good economic situation: in recent years German companies 
have not had problems with international expansion, have benefited from do-
mestic consumption on the German market, and could also obtain cheap credit 
thanks to the extremely low cost of debt service. In the cases of France and 
Italy, levels of subsidies have risen because these governments have been pro-
tecting the industries most affected by the economic crisis.
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Figure 12. Expenditure on subsidies relative to GDP in Germany
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source: 26. Bericht der Bundesregierung über die Entwicklung der Finanzhilfen des Bundes und der 
Steuervergünstigungen für die Jahre 2015 bis 2018, Federal Government of Germany, 2017, https://www.
bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Standardartikel/Themen/Oeffentliche_Finanzen/Subven-
tionspolitik/2017-08-23-subventionsbericht-26-anlage.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1; C. Laaser, 
A. Rosenschon, Subventionsbericht und die Kieler Subventionsampel: Finanzhilfen des Bundes und bis Steu-
ervergünstigungen 2017–eine Aktualisierung, Institute for World Economy in Kiel, 2018, https://www.ifw-
-kiel.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/-ifw/Kieler_Beitraege_zur_Wirtschaftspolitik/
wipo_14.pdf
However, if we look more closely at the data on the scope of subsidies in the 
German economy, it turns out that the full extent of financing for private en-
terprises is greater than that indicated by the above data; they are granted di-
rect support in the form of funding only rarely (in the federal government’s 
reports, subsidies are defined very narrowly as direct financial assistance 
granted to the private sector by the state)72. According to the government, the 
drop in the amount of subsidies for the German economy has been continuous 
since the 1970s. In the period 2005–2017 the share of grants fell from 1.1% to 
0.8% of GDP. However, according to the Institute for World Economy in Kiel, 
the extent of support for the private sector in direct or indirect forms is much 
higher, and is subject to strong fluctuations. Until the global financial crisis, 
72 In German reporting on the extent of the subsidies, one problem is the country's federal 
structure. Although the state has the obligation to prepare annual reports on the scope of 
the subsidies, the data obtained from the Bundesländer are not standardised, because each 
province applies its own definition of what constitutes a subsidy. In addition, the data does 
not include support for some public sector companies, such as Deutsche Bahn. Likewise, the 
state does not count investments in the field of research and innovation as subsidies.
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the share of subsidies and indirect forms of support fell from 5% of GDP in 2005 
to 3.5% in 2008–2009, then rose again to 5% of GDP in 2012–2013, and in subse-
quent years fell to 3.5% of GDP.
Figure 13. Federal subsidies and tax breaks for specific targets in 2017
Other 39%
Maintenance 1%
Adaptation 49%
Adaptation 3%
Improving productivity 11%
Subsidies Tax relief
Other 27%
Improving productivity 16%
Maintenance 54%
source: 26. Bericht der Bundesregierung über die Entwicklung der Finanzhilfen des Bundes und der Steuer-
vergünstigungen für die Jahre 2015 bis 2018, Federal Government of Germany, 2017, https://www.bundesfi-
nanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Standardartikel/Themen/Oeffentliche_Finanzen/Subventionspoli-
tik/2017-08-23-subventionsbericht-26-anlage.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1
An analysis of the structure of expenditures for specific purposes shows that 
Germany avoids subsidising companies solely in order to ‘keep them alive’, pre-
ferring to grant them financial relief. Only 1% of funds goes directly to the de-
clining industries, whereas up to 49% is earmarked for the purposes of adapt-
ing to the market situation. With regard to distributing benefits in the form 
of tax breaks, the reverse is true; up to 54% of funds go to declining industries 
(those which have little prospect of development and are in need of state sup-
port to maintain their profitability), while only 3% goes towards restructuring 
companies to adapt to changes on the market.
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Figure 14. The manner of allocation of federal subsidies and tax relief for 
specific purposes
Agriculture and fishing 9%
Mining 5%
Transportation 69%
Other 10%
Mediation when renting apartments 7%
source: C. Laaser, A. Rosenschon, Kieler Subventionsbericht und die Kieler Subventionsampel: Finanzhilfen 
und des Bundes Steuervergünstigungen bis 2017–eine Aktualisierung, https://www.ifw-kiel.de/fileadmin/Da-
teiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/-ifw/Kieler_Beitraege_zur_Wirtschaftspolitik/wipo_14.pdf, p. 11.
In 2017, out of a sum of €29 billion, 9% went on agriculture and fisheries, 5% on 
mining, 69% on transport, 7% on mediation in renting living space73. To this 
must be added the amount of support available to all sectors of the economy. 
Out of a sum of €7.6 billion, 8% went on structural and regional policy, 50% 
on the employment funding policy, 9% on retraining employees and 19% on 
support for SMEs. Many of these funds went to the strongest German compa-
nies. In recent years the automotive industry has received €18 million of sup-
port for the design of self-driving cars and €16 million for the construction of 
infrastructure to charge electric cars74. After several years of resistance, the 
government gave way to the companies, and in 2016 allocated subsidies to buy 
electric cars, which costs the budget €275 million annually75. In turn, the Fed-
eral Ministry of Education and Scientific Research has assigned €120 million 
to support Industry 4.0 projects.
73 This amount does not include the funds contributed to the economy from the regional lev-
el. The federal states and municipalities offer financial aid to companies worth 28.5 billion 
euros: 48% in subsidies and 52% in tax relief; 26. Bericht der Bundesregierung über die En-
twicklung der Finanzhilfen des Bundes und der Steuervergünstigungen für die Jahre 2015 bis 2018, 
Federal Government of Germany, 2017, https://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/
DE/Standardartikel/Themen/Oeffentliche_Finanzen/Subventionspolitik/2017-08-23-sub-
ventionsbericht-26-anlage.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1
74 ‘Wieso wird der Elektro-Porsche mit Steuergeld unterstützt?’, Die Welt, 22 March 2016, 
http://www.welt.de/print/die_welt/politik/article153551570/Wieso-wird-der-Elektro-Por-
sche-mit-Steuergeld-unterstuetzt.html 
75 K. Popławski, ‘Niemcy: rząd wprowadzi dotacje dla samochodów elektrycznych’ [Germany: 
The government will introduce subsidies for electric cars], Analizy OSW, 11 May 2016, 
https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2016-05-11/niemcy-rzad-wprowadzi-
dotacje-dla-samochodow-elektrycznych
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A wide range of support is also assured for the logistics industry, which is 
struggling with competition from Central and Eastern European companies. 
According to industry associations, logistics companies can receive funding 
from 750 support programmes, and receive grants for programmes including 
the creation of an energy management system, replacing tyres, training em-
ployees, AdBlue fuel, and building logistic centres76. Usually environmental 
and safety considerations motivate the granting of such subsidies.
The government also offers support to regions with structural problems. Under 
the ‘Improvement of the regional economic structure’ programme (Verbesser-
ung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur) funds are given to companies from the 
eastern and northern parts of the country. The essence of the programme is to 
promote investment in craft businesses in order to provide jobs and increase 
revenue through the development of efficient infrastructure, financing strate-
gies and concepts for regional development and networking local actors, pro-
moting competitiveness and innovation in the SME sector, and activating the 
regions’ inhabitants. The programme is funded from government and regional 
sources as well as EU funds; in 2014, out of a sum of around €1 billion, 80% went 
on craft businesses, 19% on service providers, and 1% on other industries77. 
New instruments of support for farmers in case of bad weather have also been 
created, costing €300 million a year.
Support for exports has also become a way to push through structural chang-
es in the agricultural regions. One example of this might be the ‘Improving 
agricultural structures and coastal protection’ programme (Verbesserung der 
Agrarstruktur und Küstenschutz)78 which is being implemented by the Federal 
Ministry of Food and Agriculture. Its aims are to create agriculture and for-
estry which can compete on international markets, and to adapt agriculture 
to the challenges of climate change, environmental protection and consumer 
rights. This programme’s annual expenditure amounts to about €1 billion, of 
which 60% is financed by the federal government and 40% by the Länder. Sup-
76 ‘Noch viel Geld für Logistik abrufbar’, 17 June 2015, https://www.dvz.de/rubriken/manage-
ment-recht/detail/news/noch-viel-geld-fuer-logistik-abrufbar.html 
77 ‘Förderung der Wirtschaft gewerblichen; Bewilligungen nach gewerblichen Sektoren 2014 ein-
schließlich EFRE’, http://www.bmwi.de/DE/Themen/Wirtschaft/regionalpolitik,did=557750.
html 
78 ‘Förderung landwirtschaftlicher Unternehmen ab 2014’, Federal Ministry of Food and Agri-
culture, 2014, http://www.bmel.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/Broschueren/FoerderungLand-
wUnternehmen2014.pdf;jsessionid=F7A80C2976CC479556D76CCA93156E2B.2_cid385?__
blob=publicationFile
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port is provided in the form of grants and low-interest loans. The funds are 
earmarked for activities such as co-investment in agriculture, diversification 
of sources of income, support for rural tourism, as well as granting loans to 
support rural entrepreneurship and improving the export competitiveness of 
agricultural enterprises.
The system of export credits, investment guarantees and programmes to sup-
port the process of internationalising companies is still an important instru-
ment of the country’s industrial policy. In 2015, the German state underwrote 
contracts totalling €26 billion (equivalent to 2.2% of annual exports)79. The 
largest part of these guarantees went on exports to Russia, the US, Egypt, Tur-
key, Italy and China. 75% of the guarantees went to firms exporting to develop-
ing countries, which primarily served as a hedge against political risk. The fi-
nancial guarantee system is also useful for German companies as they expand 
into developed countries such as the US and Italy, which often means that the 
guarantees allow them to reduce the cost of export credit.
An analysis of the structure of the aid provided leads to some interesting con-
clusions. The fact that less than 20% of the guarantees went to the shipbuilding 
industry shows that it is an effective instrument for supporting the interna-
tionalisation of industries with structural problems (more on this in the section 
4.2). 9% of the guarantees went to the energy sector, which is intended to help 
in expanding the renewable energy sector. The manufacturing industry was 
also covered by the guarantees (9%), as was the aeronautics industry (8%). 7% 
of the funds were earmarked to support the gas extraction industry. In recent 
years there has been a redefinition of the role of the development policy, which 
today is an important factor in promoting exports. In order to promote German 
environmental technologies, the following programmes have been created: the 
Renewable Energies Export Initiative80(Exportinitiative Erneuerbare Energien) 
and the Energy Efficiency Export Initiative (Exportinitiative Energieeffizienz). 
These help SMEs from the fields of renewable energy sources and improving 
energy efficiency to expand internationally. Funds from this programme have 
been allocated to financing participation in trade fairs, business trips and 
promotional events, education, and promoting German technology to foreign 
79 Exportkreditgarantien der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Jahresbericht 2015, https://www.aga-
portal.de/_Resources/Persistent/c7c432b5e5c02233220ffd27856f64c7c28787d3/jb_2015.pdf
80 The principles of the programme are available at https://www.bafa.de/DE/Wirtschafts_
Mittelstandsfoerderung/Auslandsmarkterschliessung/Exportinitiative_Energie/exportinitiative_
energie_node.html
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policy-makers, academics, journalists and students. In many cases, the state 
institutions help in organising such events, for example through the foreign 
branches of the German Chamber of Commerce and Industry.
table 4. Differences between new and old industrial policy 
old industrial policy The new industrial policy
Tax breaks for energy-intensive companies Focus on technologies and services
Supporting national champions
Aiming for sustainable development and 
the needs of society
Emphasis on low costs and wages Emphasis on innovation
Subsidies for large traditional companies The use of market forces and competition
Optimism in planning
Greater realism and exploring market 
needs
Conditions set by the state
Conditions set by dialogue between vari-
ous actors
Sectoral strategies Systemic approach, shared vision
Decreasing importance of manufacturing
New services and environmental tech-
nologies complementary to manufactur-
ing products
source: K. Aiginger, T. Bauer, ‘Industriepolitik 2.0’, Wirtschaftsdienst 96 (8), 2016; http://archiv.wirtscha-
ftsdienst.eu/jahr/2016/8/industriepolitik-20/#footnote-32982-4-backlink, pp. 592–602.
The traditional industrial policy instruments that exist in Germany are often 
directed towards offering instruments to subsidise certain sectors or compa-
nies, or to carry out giant investments subsidised by the state. This approach 
has been criticised because it leads to the implementation of inefficient pro-
jects, which are based often on unrealistic assumptions and poorly developed 
strategies (for example, the reconstruction of the Stuttgart 2020 railway junc-
tion can be considered as a misguided investment, as it cost huge amounts and 
caused strong protests connected with accusations of mismanagement as well 
as environmental questions81). 
81 ‘Protesty obywatelskie osłabiają chadecję w Badenii-Wirtembergii’ [Civil protests weaken 
the Christian Democrats in Baden-Württemberg], Analizy OSW, 6 October 2010, https://www.
osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2010-10-06/protesty-obywatelskie-oslabiaja-chadecje-w-
badenii-wirtembergii
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The way in which the recipients of grants are selected has been subject to criti-
cism from representatives of academia and non-governmental organisations, 
who question the sense of giving grants to profitable businesses and the use 
of public funds to support the riskiest projects82. The German press has also 
accused the government of hypocrisy; Berlin criticised Athens for abolishing 
taxes on shipowners, while itself introducing a similar instrument in 2015. 
Germany has also introduced instruments of financial support under the pre-
text of improving some companies’ environmental performance; for example, 
road transport companies can obtain subsidies to purchase tyres for their ve-
hicles under the Support for Environment and Security programme83. 
Within the German debate, the need to implement a so-called new industrial 
policy is being raised increasingly often. This policy should eliminate the draw-
backs of the conventional solutions84. Its main objectives include: focusing on 
creating innovative products and services to meet developmental and social 
needs; stimulating innovation; taking into account the knowledge and skills 
not only of state institutions, but also of representatives of public and expert 
circles, and building support mechanisms on the principles of competition.
One example of this new type of industrial policy is the project of energy trans-
formation (Energiewende) which has been implemented since 2011. This envis-
ages the creation of conditions for the development of renewable-energy and 
energy-efficiency technologies, so that they become the new flagship export 
product (more on this in section 4.4). The process of designing this transforma-
tion was contributed to not only by representatives of public administration 
or business, but also by social organisations. Its strategy is focused on the long 
term, and its support mechanisms are oriented so as to achieve specific goals, 
rather than to subsidise specific companies. In accordance with this principle, 
the government was ready to significantly reduce the profits of the traditional 
industrial concerns (such as E.ON and RWE) during the Energiewende’s im-
plementation period in the name of expanding the potential of the renewable 
energy industry. Producers of environment-friendly energy were subsidised 
82 D. Bocking, ‘Wie Deutschland seine Wirtschaft päppelt’, Der Spiegel, 9 April 2018, http://
www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/subventionen-wie-die-deutsche-wirtschaft-gepaep-
pelt-wird-a-1201607.html
83 https://www.bag.bund.de/DE/Navigation/Foerderprogrammeme/Deminimis/deminimis_
node.html 
84 K. Aiginger, T. Bauer, ‘Industriepolitik 2.0’, Wirtschaftsdienst 96 (8), http://archiv.wirtschafts-
dienst.eu/jahr/2016/8/industriepolitik-20/#footnote-32982-4-backlink, pp. 592–602.
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directly from the pockets of consumers by charges added to their electric en-
ergy bills85. The subsidisation of renewable energy sources resulted in a limit 
to energy price rises for German industry, as it launched heavily subsidised 
renewable energy onto the market and reduced wholesale energy prices on the 
German stock exchange. In the period 2013–2015 the German steel industry 
was able to reduce its energy costs by €9 billion, while British companies could 
only manage a reduction of €200 million86. In addition, the renewable-energy 
subsidy system includes a form of support for energy-intensive enterprises 
which are partially or completely exempted from subsidies. In 2015 alone, this 
amount was reduced by €4.8 billion87.
85 The fee for RES is around 23% of the electricity bill. In 2017 due to the RES subsidies, produc-
ers were given around €30 billion, and the forecasts for 2018 run at about €32 billion.
86 In Britain, unlike in Germany, the costs of financing climate policy are incurred to a great-
er extent by companies rather than consumers. See K. Stacey, ‘Steel crisis turns up heat on 
energy subsidies’, Financial Times, 3 April 2016, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d91c122c-
f828-11e5-96db-fc683b5e52db.html#axzz44qO01bfp
87 ‘Firmen Verlangen 4.8 Milliarden Euro discount auf Strompreis’, Manager Magazin, 
15.07.2015, http://www.manager-magazin.de/unternehmen/artikel/firmen-verlangen-
4-8-milliarden-rabatt-auf-strompreis-a-1043715.html
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iV. case sTudies oF supporT For German indusTry 
The following case studies contribute to the analysis of the German state’s influ-
ence on the structure of the economy, the support it offers to declining indus-
tries (here, the shipbuilding industry), how it bolsters the position of thriving 
industries (the automotive industry), and the development of new technologies 
(renewable energy industry).
1. shaping the structure of the economy
The trend towards privatisation was especially evident in Germany in the 
1990s, when the state reduced its stake in the telecommunications, postal, en-
ergy and air travel sectors88. Over time, however, German society started to 
evaluate these activities negatively, as it did not see any clear benefits from 
privatisation in the form of better quality services or reduced prices89. In the 
period 2007–2014, support for the further privatisation of state-owned com-
panies fell from 24% to 12%, and support for maintaining the status quo rose 
(from 50% to 57%), as it did for the re-nationalisation of private property (from 
19% to 28%)90. When in 2016 German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble pro-
posed the partial privatisation of motorways in Germany in order to modernise 
them, he quickly had to withdraw the proposal due to fierce public criticism91.
German politicians seem increasingly unwilling to limit the state’s participa-
tion in the economy. The Treasury has a 100% stake in Deutsche Bahn, 32% in 
Deutsche Telekom92 and 21% in Deutsche Post. In addition, the federal prov-
ince of Lower Saxony holds a 20% stake in Volkswagen93. The state also re-
88 J. Leidinger, M. Steinhäuser, ‘Lieber Staat als Privat’, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 17 May 2010, 
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/privatisierung-in-deutschland-lieber-staat-als-
privat-1.711088
89 ‘Privatisierung staatlicher Leistungen–Was wollen die Bürger?’, Forsa, 1 August 2008, http://
www.who-owns-the-world.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/01/forsa.pdf
90 ‘Bürgerbefragung öffentlicher Dienst: Einschätzungen, Erfahrungen und Erwartungen’, 
Bundesleitung des DBB Beamtenbund und Tarifunion 2014, http://www.dbb.de/fileadmin/
pdfs/2014/forsa_2014.pdf, p. 37.
91 ‘Schäubles Autobahn-Plan offenbar ist vom Tisch’, Die Welt, 23 November 2016, https://www.
welt.de/politik/deutschland/article159717628/Schaeubles-Autobahn-Plan-ist-offenbar-vom-
Tisch.html 
92 In 2016, the government also decided to slightly increase its stake in Deutsche Telekom from 
31.8% to 32%.
93 Under a special law, the federal province of Lower Saxony is able to block the decisions of the 
board of the company, despite the fact that under German legislation this power is vested in 
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tains a significant interest in the energy sector. German municipalities (in-
cluding the cities of Dortmund and Essen) also hold about 24% of shares in 
RWE94, and the company EnBW is mostly owned by the federal province of 
Baden-Württemberg. After the outbreak of the global financial crisis, the state 
acquired shares in several major financial institutions such as Commerzbank 
and Hypo Real Estate, which resulted in an increase in its share of the sec-
tor from 34% to 50%95. In addition, the German Bundesländer have a significant 
share in the financial sector through the Landesbanken which they control.
The federal government’s influence on the strategic areas of the economy is in-
creased thanks to its shareholdings in strategic sectors, together with the op-
eration of specific legal regulations. For example, the Federal Ministry of Infra-
structure forced Deutsche Telekom to make a written commitment to accelerate 
the development of infrastructure in the country’s most digitally backward com-
munities96. The state-owned Deutsche Bahn can always expect a lot of support, 
and for many years the federal government has been criticised for favouring the 
company by maintaining its control over access to rail infrastructure97. It was 
not until 2013 that a law prohibiting bus connections from running on routes of 
rail tracks, which had been in operation for decades, was abolished98. However, 
Deutsche Bahn can still count on privileged access to rail infrastructure99.
The divergence of views in the dispute about where the boundary of the gov-
ernment’s intervention in market processes should be became apparent during 
shareholders which own at least 25% of the company’s shares. Germany does not intend to 
change this law, despite many years of legal disputes with the European Commission on this 
matter. ‘Germany will uphold the veto over Volkswagen’s strategic decisions’, OSW Analy-
ses, 30 October 2013, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013-10-30/germa-
ny-will-uphold-veto-over-volkswagens-strategic-decisions
94 ‘RWE-Kommunen verzichten Beteiligung auf’, Handelsblatt, 28 September 2016, http://www.
handelsblatt.com/finanzen/maerkte/ipo/innogy-boersengang-rwe-kommunen-verzichten-
auf-beteiligung/14613574.html 
95 Ch. Kaserer, ‘Staatliche Hilfen für Banken und ihre Kosten–und Merkmale einer Notwen-
digkeit Ausstiegsstrategie’, https://www.ibbnetzwerk-gmbh.com/uploads/media/Kaserer-
Exitstrategien_2010_.pdf, p. 9.
96 D. Delhaes, I. Karabasz, ‘Die stille Verabredung’, Handelsblatt, 30 January 2017, p. 8.
97 ‘Bund benachteiligt Bahn-Konkurrenten’, Tagesschau, 22 July 2015, https://www.tagesschau.
de/wirtschaft/bahn-monopol-101.html
98 M. Riemen, ‘Fernbusse–echte Konkurrenz für die Bahn’, RP Online, 2 January 2013, http://
www.rp-online.de/nrw/staedte/duesseldorf/fernbusse-echte-konkurrenz-fuer-die-bahn-
aid-1.3121640
99 ‘Bund benachteiligt Bahn-Konkurrenten’, Tagesschau, 22 July 2015, https://www.tagesschau.
de/wirtschaft/bahn-monopol-101.html
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Edeka’s takeover in 2015 of the Kaiser’s Tengelmann supermarket chain, which 
at that time was in a bad financial situation. Due to the risk of Edeka monopo-
lising the market, the Cartel Authority wanted to block the transaction; the 
Bundestag’s Committee on Monopolies also expressed its opposition to this 
move. Ultimately, however, the then Minister of Economy and head of the SPD 
Sigmar Gabriel decided to grant a one-off authorisation for the transaction, ar-
guing that protecting jobs took priority. Gabriel’s decision was subsequently 
annulled by an administrative court, which considered it as overly partial, and 
Edeka had to sell some of the supermarkets to the Rewe network100.
Another example of politicians interfering in the market involved the bank-
ruptcy of Air Berlin. After this was announced in September 2017, many politi-
cians of the then ruling coalition, including the Minister of Transport Alexan-
der Dobrindt (CSU), declared their support for a takeover by Lufthansa, which 
would strengthen its position as a national champion in the context of increas-
ing competitive pressure from outside Europe. These measures were criticised 
by former representatives of the Committee on Monopolies, who stated that 
such a move would not promote competition on the German aviation market. 
Lufthansa, which before it acquired Air Berlin had a monopoly on 10 routes 
connecting German cities with foreign countries, could have obtained a mo-
nopoly on a further 16 routes within Germany, possibly leading to a rise in pric-
es101. Finally, with the support of German politicians, Lufthansa bought 81 of 
the bankrupt company’s 130 aircraft, as well as the rights to most of Air Berlin’s 
old routes. Lufthansa also acquired the most lucrative part of the business, but 
only took on 1700 of the roughly 8000 previous employees. At a time when Air 
Berlin was still continuing its negotiations with Lufthansa, the German gov-
ernment gave the former a bridging loan, and obliged its officials to use Air 
Berlin despite many complaints about the company’s growing organisational 
problems. These actions were criticised by Lufthansa’s private competitors.
With the ongoing progress of globalisation, government institutions have been 
increasingly disturbed by the wave of takeovers of German high-tech enter-
prises by their competitors from China. In July 2017 the Federal Ministry of 
100 ‘Edeka und Rewe einig bei Kaiser's Tengelmann’, Die Welt, 3 December 2016, https://www.
welt.de/print/die_welt/wirtschaft/article159942201/Edeka-und-Rewe-einig-bei-Kaiser-s-
Tengelmann.html
101 S. Happel, ‘Die neue Macht der Lufthansa: Wo die Preise steigen könnten’, WirtschaftsWoche, 
25 October 2017, http://www.wiwo.de/unternehmen/industrie/die-neue-macht-der-luf-
thansa-wo-die-preise-steigen-koennten/20501426.html
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
59
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 0
4/
20
19
Economy and Energy amended a regulation to the act on external economic re-
lations102, thus increasing the number of sectors protected from takeovers, as 
well as (for security reasons) adding the option of investigating proposed take-
overs in sensitive sectors. At the request of Germany, among others, the Euro-
pean Commission is working on amendments to EU legislation which would al-
low greater supervision over takeovers of companies by investors from outside 
the EU. These changes were connected with the controversy in Germany about 
the wave of takeovers of German SMEs by companies from China. Particular 
indignation among German public opinion was aroused by the purchase of the 
leading robotics company Kuka by the Chinese fund Midea103, which the fed-
eral government was unable to prevent. This prompted the Federal Ministry of 
Economy and Energy to be more cautious about investments from China, and 
to reconsider issuing permits to subsequent transactions involving Chinese in-
vestors, such as the acquisitions of the chip maker Aixtron and the manufac-
turer of lighting technology LEDvance. Eventually only the latter transaction 
was completed, as the acquisition of Aixtron (which also had branches in the 
US) was blocked by the US administration for security reasons.
2. restructuring the shipbuilding industry 
The German shipbuilding industry has been struggling for years with the 
problem of low profitability, a phenomenon which was further aggravated by 
the outbreak of the 2008 global financial crisis. In 2008, turnover in this sec-
tor dropped by 26% to €5.3 billion, and six large shipyards were put at risk of 
bankruptcy. The German government has had a consistent policy of support-
ing the shipbuilding industry, as it believes that a country so dependent on 
global trade, like Germany, must have its own shipbuilding industry, especial-
ly as 90% of global trade is carried out through water transport104. Moreover, 
the shipbuilding industry was a major employer in the less developed north-
eastern Bundesländer, and the share of value added for the German economy in 
the final product of many shipyards is as high as 100% (this means that all the 
revenue from the ships’ construction goes to domestic producers).
102 Neunte Verordnung zur Änderung der Außenwirtschaftsverordnung, Ministry of Economy and 
Energy, 14 July 2017, https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/V/neunte-aendvo-
awv.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=6
103 K. Popławski, ‘Capital does have nationality: Germany’s fears of Chinese investments’, 
OSW Commentary, 25 January 2017, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commen-
tary/2017-01-25/capital-does-have-nationality-germanys-fears-chinese
104 http://www.ics-shipping.org/shipping-facts/shipping-and-world-trade
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Supporting the shipbuilding sector financially and enabling it to carry out struc-
tural reforms has become a priority for the German government. At the same 
time, it has tried to do so without recourse to direct aid, not wishing to invite 
criticism from the public or alarm the EU’s institutions. On the basis of dialogue 
with representatives of the industry, the German government developed a far-
reaching strategy for transformation in the sector, in order to revive the indus-
try’s competitiveness on foreign markets. A representative of the rank of Sec-
retary of State was appointed within the structure of the Ministry of Economy 
and tasked with making contacts with the shipbuilding industry; his task was to 
analyse the sector’s problems, create new instruments to support it, and devise 
a comprehensive development strategy. As Germany could not compete with 
most shipyards in Asia in terms of costs, the primary goal was to increase in-
novation, the intention being to focus on the production of specialised ships and 
components for them. On this basis, German shipyards were to gain the abil-
ity to provide customers with solutions to complex problems, for example, by 
ensuring its ships displayed greater energy efficiency or better environmental 
performance. This goal was to be assisted by the following measures:
 – grants for the development of innovation (30% of the investment);
 – funding research in collaboration with specialised research institutions;
 – financial support for cooperation with other industries, e.g. in the field of 
extracting raw materials from the seabed, the production of autonomous 
maritime craft, and of technologies related to maritime safety. 
The government allocated €190 million within 330 projects in 2011–2016 to improve 
innovation at the shipyards105. Another means of supporting the shipbuilding in-
dustry was connected with the energy transformation project being carried out in 
Germany. The shipbuilding industry could rely on contracts as part of the expan-
sion of wind farms106. Shipyards may also apply for additional funding to develop 
the technology to construct offshore wind farms, for example as part of the Min-
istry of the Economy’s ‘Next-generation sea technologies’ programme107. At present 
shipyards already have orders totalling €700 million for the construction of wind 
farms. By 2030 wind farms with a capacity of 15 GW are to be installed along the 
105 https://www.vsm.de/sites/default/files/dokumente/c32d05e474cd162d7f48918b863d36e7/
schiffbau-industrie_i-2016.pdf, p. 7.
106 ‘Milliardenauftrag für deutsche Werften’, Tagesschau, 24 May 2017, https://www.tagesschau.
de/wirtschaft/werften-kreuzfahrtschiffe-101.html
107 ‘Maritime Koordinator: BMWi fördert Vernetzung von maritime Branche und Offshore-
Windenergie’, http://bmwi.de/DE/Themen/energie,did=764560.html
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
61
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 0
4/
20
19
German coast. Around 143,000 people are currently working in the offshore wind-
energy industry, with a capacity of 5.3 GW. The state has also supported the ship-
yards’ export activities, offering them guarantees which amounted to €5.5 billion 
in 2014 (30% of all the export guarantees which the government has granted)108.
The public authorities are trying to improve conditions for the development of 
the shipbuilding sector by financing educational programmes for specialists in 
the field, as well as new research centres which will allow the shipyards to at-
tain higher levels of technology and eliminate the generation gap. About 200 in-
stitutes throughout the country are involved in marine technology research, 
which generates a turnover totalling €11 billion annually109. The position of Ger-
man shipyards in the field of civil security is to be assisted by their collabora-
tion with the German Aerospace Centre. The innovativeness of the shipyards is 
also to be aided by the German Marine Centre, established in 2017 in Hamburg, 
which will coordinate research in the field of marine technology110.
Figure 15. Turnover (billions of euros) and employment (in thousands 
of persons) in the shipbuilding industry
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108 Exportkreditgarantien der Bundesrepublik…, op. cit.
109 Jahresbericht 2015/2016, Verband für Schiffbau und Meerestechnik, 2016, https://www.vsm.
de/sites/default/files/dokumente/2ae6737c9b62e04cabf7b35e4db75d49/vsm_jahresber-
icht_2015-2016.pdf, p. 11.
110 Maritimes Zentrum entwickelt sein Profil, KN, 30.04.2018, http://www.kn-online.de/Nachrichten/
Hamburg/Das-neue-Deutsche-Maritime-Zentrum-DMZ-in-Hamburg-entwickelt-sein-Profil 
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Since the collapse in 2011, trade turnover in the shipbuilding industry has be-
gun to maintain an upward trend. The effectiveness of state aid is also demon-
strated by the employment rate, which has remained stable since a decline in 
2008–2012. The state’s mobilisation has also helped the shipyards to develop 
their cooperation with the most modern branches of German industry, which 
may allow the creation of innovative products in the future.
3. defending the automotive industry’s interests
One of the key driving forces of the German economy is the automotive indus-
try, which is why the state works to stabilise its revenues in crisis situations, 
takes care to raise its technological level, and supports its expansion into in-
ternational markets.
The German government’s involvement in stabilising the situation in the au-
tomotive industry was evident during the global financial crisis. Almost im-
mediately after its outbreak in 2008, the German government launched the 
Kurzarbeit programme; this made it possible to impose temporary limits on the 
duration of working periods for the employees of companies affected by a drop 
in demand for their products. Thanks to this programme, in 2008–2009 car-
makers avoided mass redundancies that had threatened up to 50,000 employ-
ees111. Another important instrument of support for the automotive industry 
was the environmental bonus scheme, which allows consumers to obtain fi-
nancing to purchase a new car in exchange for scrapping the old one. The pro-
gramme received €1.5 billion, which allowed the purchase of around 600,000 
cars to be subsidised. The popularity that the programme enjoyed prompted 
the government to raise the amount of support to €5 billion, which ultimately 
helped subsidise the purchase of about 1.7 million cars and protected the in-
dustry from a collapse in sales112. A similar programme was launched in 2016. 
Meanwhile, the government has planned to introduce subsidies on the pur-
chase of electric cars, out of fear that competitors to German carmakers will 
master the technology to produce these cars more quickly. These subsidies are 
intended to spur the sales of electric cars, in order to achieve greater econo-
mies of scale and reduce the costs of producing this type of vehicle.
111 M. Dalan, ‘Wie die auf den Autoindustrie Abschwung reagiert’, Die Welt, 29 October 2008, 
https://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article2646093/Wie-die-Autoindustrie-auf-den-Ab-
schwung-reagiert.html
112 I. Schindler, ‘Die Folgen der Abwrackprämie’, Badische Zeitung, 12 February 2010, http://
www.badische-zeitung.de/loerrach/die-folgen-der-abwrackpraemie--26878300.html
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Another part of the anti-crisis policy was the German government’s negoti-
ations with General Motors in order to keep jobs in that company’s German 
plants. In 2009 the US company considered selling its subsidiary Opel because 
of its financial problems. This meant that a new investor would have had to 
decide which factories in Belgium, Germany, Spain or the UK would lose the 
most jobs. Chancellor Merkel’s government began to exert pressure on Gen-
eral Motors’ directors to sell their factories to the investor most favoured by 
Germany, the Canadian-Russian consortium of Magna and Sberbank. Ger-
many had a strong bargaining chip because it had given Opel a bridging loan 
worth €1.5 billion, and promised another loan of €4.5 billion if the 25,000 jobs 
in Opel’s German factories were guaranteed, which – in their opinion – would 
have been assured by the above-mentioned choice of investor. The European 
Commission, together with representatives from the other countries in which 
Opel assembly plants operate, expressed doubts as to the legality of these relief 
activities in Germany113. Finally, at the end of 2009, GM decided to keep Opel in 
its hands, arguing that the market situation had improved. The German gov-
ernment demanded a punctual repayment of the loans it had previously grant-
ed114, and also rejected the company’s request next year for financial assistance 
for restructuring worth €1.1 billion euros115.
An important role in creating favourable conditions to develop the automo-
tive industry and resolve its problems is played by regular consultations be-
tween the companies’ representatives and the public administration. Between 
2012 and 2015 there were over 70 meetings between representatives of the Fed-
eral Chancellery and representatives of the automotive industry, and the di-
rectors of Volkswagen met Chancellor Merkel 20 times116. These consultations 
served not only to discuss future problems and challenges, but also to coordi-
nate actions in case of emergencies. This is evidenced by the fact that when the 
scandal concerning Volkswagen’s falsification of emissions data broke in 2015, 
the frequency of meetings between the car companies’ leaders and government 
113 ‘Unfair, uncompetitive and upsets the neighbors’, Der Spiegel, 14 September 2009, http://
www.spiegel.de/international/germany/magna-s-opel-deal-unfair-uncompetitive-and-up-
sets-the-neighbors-a-648866.html
114 ‘GM makes shock decision to keep Opel’, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/au-
to-industry-poker-game-ends-gm-makes-shock-decision-to-keep-opel-a-659241.html
115 ‘Germany: Federal government has rejected the motion for financial support for Opel’, OSW 
Analyses, 16 June 2010, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2010-06-16/germa-
ny-federal-government-has-rejected-motion-financial-support
116 D. Delhaes, ‘Lobbyismus: direkter Draht–zu jeder Regierung’, Handelsblatt, 24 September 
2015, p. 7.
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representatives increased significantly117. In 2017 it was revealed that not only 
Volkswagen but also other German carmakers could have installed devices in 
their cars that manipulated the measurements of exhaust gases, which raised 
the threat that German courts would impose a ban on cars with older models of 
diesel engines from entering city centres. The German government convened 
a summit with company directors on the matter which was also attended by 
federal and provincial ministers. Its intended effect was to negotiate a solution 
to the problem of German cars not complying with the environmental stand-
ards in force in the country.
Consultations at the highest level are also used to agree on measures to protect 
the automotive industry’s interests on foreign markets, which increasingly 
forces Germany to block the implementation of new environmental regula-
tions. This has been confirmed by Chancellor Merkel herself. During a hearing 
on the Volkswagen fuel affair by a Bundestag inquiry committee, she acknowl-
edged that Germany had to ensure a balance between the implementation of 
laws protecting the environment and the automotive sector’s options in up-
holding them, because the interests of the EU countries are very diverse in this 
regard118. In 2013 Ireland, which then held the presidency of the EU Council, 
suddenly removed a vote from the agenda regarding a plan to tighten CO2 emis-
sion regulations for cars, which would have been unfavourable for the German 
automotive industry119. Most likely, one of the main reasons for this decision 
was the pressure Germany exerted on Ireland, whose economy had suffered 
heavily as a result of the eurozone crisis (Germany had the final say on the 
granting of loans to Ireland).
Chancellor Merkel has also been accused of putting pressure on the authorities 
in California to moderate environmental regulations which affected German 
manufacturers of diesel-powered cars. According to the environmental move-
ment in Germany, the federal government has played an important role in 
117 In the period from September 2015 to April 2016, the heads of automotive companies and in-
dustry associations have met Chancellor Merkel directly five times, five times with the head 
of her office, eight times with the minister of the economy, five times with the minister of in-
frastructure and transport, three times with the minister of justice and once each with the 
foreign minister and finance minister. See the response to the question put by members of 
die Linke, Herbert Behrens, Caren Lay & Eva Bulling-Schröter: No. 18/12060, http://dip21.
bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/128/1812880.pdf
118 D. Delhaes, T. Hoppe, ‘Direkter Draht ins Kanzleramt’, Handelsblatt, 9 March 2017, p. 6.
119 ‘Merkel seeks to derail EU compromise deal on car emissions’, 27 June 2013, http://www.eu-
ractiv.com/section/transport/news/merkel-seeks-to-derail-eu-compromise-deal-on-car-
emissions/
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shaping EU law to favour the sales of diesel cars, and also in discouraging pro-
ducers from lowering emissions from their cars, despite the numerous tech-
nical capabilities which exist to improve their environmental performance120. 
Germany has repeatedly insisted that the government in Beijing should not 
introduce new strict environmental criteria that could limit German car com-
panies’ sales in China.
In recent years, more and more questions have arisen as to whether Germany’s 
policy of supporting its automotive companies does not contradict the country’s 
declared objective of becoming the world leader in environmental matters. The 
close relationship between the German government and representatives of its 
car companies has been criticised by environmentalists, who believe that these 
relations and the accompanying closeness of their positions blocks technologi-
cal progress and weakens the authorities’ determination to introduce stricter 
environmental standards on diesel exhaust emissions121. There are also more 
and more signs that German companies cannot keep up with the pace of the 
market’s development of new automotive technologies.
For the German automotive giants, two events above all have proved to be 
disadvantageous. The outbreak of the fuel scandal has shown that the compa-
nies are making little progress towards greater environmental performance. 
It turned out that Volkswagen (as well as other German producers) had for 
years been mounting a special device designed to falsify the results of tests 
measuring the emission of harmful exhaust gases (mainly nitrogen oxides), 
while advertising their cars under the slogan of ‘Clean diesel’. The disclosure 
of this information resulted in multibillion-dollar losses for the company, 
which was forced to pay fines to the public authorities, dealers’ networks and 
consumers in many countries. It also contributed to a decline in the sales of 
diesel-powered cars, as well as the start of a debate in Germany on prohibit-
ing cars with old diesel engines (below the Euro 6 standard) from entering 
city centres. Secondly, the German automotive industry was taken aback by 
the pace of development of the Tesla company, whose sales proved that self-
driving electric cars could change the automotive market much more quickly 
than expected. Even the French carmakers, struggling with their own finan-
cial problems, were able to set aside funds to invest in electric cars faster 
120 E. Helmers, ‘Versprochen–Gebrochen: Wie die deutsche Autoindustrie den Klimaschutz 
ignoriert’, https://www.vcd.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Redaktion/Publikationsdatenbank/
Auto_Umwelt/Analyse_Modellentwicklung_deutsche_Autoindustrie_2015.pdf, p. 8.
121 Ibid., p. 3.
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than the German manufacturers, launching several models which gained 
popularity among customers.
If the German car companies do not keep up with market trends, they may lose 
a significant portion of their revenues to American companies, particularly 
in the area of  mobility services122. Self-driving cars are indeed an innovation 
which will radically change the rules governing the car market and threaten 
the current leaders.
The German government is trying to encourage companies to master new tech-
nologies by digitising the road infrastructure, creating new regulations (al-
lowing self-driving cars to be tested on German roads), subsidising research in 
this field, and improving data security. From the government’s reply to a ques-
tion from the parliamentary Left Party, it appears that the German govern-
ment allocated around €1 billion in the period 2007–2017 to fund R&D for car 
companies, and supported their investments to the tune of €200 million123. 
If one adds the subsidies to purchase new cars in exchange for scrapping old 
ones, and the reduced excise duty for diesel, the automotive industry has been 
supported with €115 billion in this period. The question is increasingly being 
asked in Germany: what portion of these funds have actually served to in-
crease innovation in the industry?
In other words, in recent years the German government has created ‘green-
house conditions’ for the automotive industry’s existence, which has revealed 
its limited motivation to implement innovations, especially in the environ-
mental field. This has led to a public relations scandal for the German economy 
(the Volkswagen fuel affair) as well as insufficient investment in new technol-
ogy. However, the efforts to stabilise the situation in the automotive industry 
during the economic downturn in 2009 can be considered extremely effective.
4. supporting the development of the green technology industry
When in 1998 the Greens entered the government for the first time in post-
war Germany, it was clear that a change to the state energy policy would be 
one of its priorities. In 18 months after taking office, the coalition government 
of Social Democrats and Greens implemented two decisions that profoundly 
122 Ibid., p. 7.
123 D. Delhaes., D. Neuerer, ‘Mit freundlicher Unterstützung’, Handelsblatt, 23 May 2017, p. 6.
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changed the country’s energy policy and led to Germany becoming a leader 
in the development of renewable energy sources. In 2000 a law on renewable 
energy sources (RES) came into force which has created some of the best con-
ditions in the world for investing in this industry, guaranteeing that inves-
tors would receive electricity produced at favourable prices. In the same year, 
the government reached an agreement with the four largest energy companies 
and the operators of nuclear power plants, after which the decision was made 
to turn off all nuclear power plants by 2022. However, the energy companies 
(including RWE and E.ON) misinterpreted this as an incentive to invest in con-
ventional coal- and gas-fuelled power plants, and not in the fledgling renew-
able energy sector.
The dynamic development of renewable energy sources in Germany meant that 
work began on devising a new paradigm of German industrial policy124. This was 
based on the assumption that in the future the world economy would become 
increasingly dependent on disappearing natural resources. Success, therefore, 
would be attained by those countries that managed to overcome these limita-
tions. The German state’s idea was to use the economy’s power to develop ma-
chinery and equipment for the production of technologies related to environ-
mental protection. The German economy thus took advantage of the increasingly 
prominent global trend of ‘greening’ industry. The new basis of Germany’s eco-
nomic policy quickly became the foundation for a consensus linking supporters 
of environmental protection and representatives of industries.
Another element of the development of an industrial policy based on ecology 
was the government’s reaction to the nuclear disaster in Fukushima in 2011. 
The CDU/CSU-FDP coalition decided to support the opposition’s environmental 
demands. It established a comprehensive energy strategy for Germany (Ener-
giewende) whose main objective was to accelerate the rapid development of re-
newable energy sources and gradually halt the utilisation of nuclear energy125. 
The Energiewende’s long-term goals are to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
by 80–95% by 2050 and increase the share of renewable energies in primary 
energy consumption to 60% (13% in 2016). The government in Berlin is hop-
ing that due to a sharp increase in investment in the development of a greener 
124 I. Blühdorn in S. Bukow, W. Seemann, Die Große Koalition: Regierung-Politik-Parteien 2005–2009, 
Heidelberg 2010, p. 215.
125 For more see A. Kwiatkowska-Drożdż (ed.), ‘Germany's energy transformation: difficult be-
ginnings’, OSW Report, 6 December 2012, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-re-
port/2012-12-06/germanys-energy-transformation-difficult-beginnings
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economy, German manufacturers will gain a technological advantage over 
their main competitors. To quote the then environment minister Peter Alt-
maier (CDU): “If we succeed, the Energiewende will be our hit export126.” 
The green industry, i.e. the environmental goods and services sector127, is seen 
in Germany as an opportunity for the German economy and a chance to boost 
German companies on the new global market. In particular the technologies 
related to wind turbines and energy efficiency could be developed by the me-
chanical engineering sector, which is very strong in Germany. According to 
data from the Federal Office for the Environment, it appears that in 2015 Ger-
many had a 13.5% share in the trade of goods on the environment sector’s glob-
al market (see Figure 16).
Figure 16. Shares of the largest suppliers of environmental goods on the world 
market
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source: Die Umweltwirtschaft in Deutschland 2017, Federal Office for the Environment, https://www.
umweltbundesamt.de/publikationen/die-umweltschutzwirtschaft-in-deutschland-0 
126 ‘Altmaier: Energiewende riesige Chance ist für Deutschland’, 6 October 2012, https://
www.derwesten.de/politik/altmaier-energiewende-ist-riesige-chance-fuer-deutschland-
id7168980.html 
127 Green industry is described in international literature as green technologies or clean technol-
ogies. The German term is Umwelttechnologien. Government reports on the subject list six 
key sectors: 1. Friendly environment, production, storage and transport of energy; 2. Ener-
gy efficiency; 3. Material and raw-material efficiency; 4. Sustainable transport; 5. The cir-
cular waste economy; 6. The sustainable water economy.
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In 2015, turnover of manufacturing and service companies in the field of en-
vironmental protection amounted to €66 billion128, of which products and 
services worth €41.4 billion were sold in Germany, while exports amounted 
to €24.6 billion. The largest sector in this area was the mechanical engineer-
ing sector (€24.6 billion). 86% of turnover (€57 billion) went on products and 
services related to climate protection, such as the production of equipment to 
generate energy from renewable sources. According to data from the Federal 
Statistical Office in 2015 around 260,000 people worked directly for the en-
vironmental sector, of whom c. 174,000 were in the manufacturing industry, 
45,500 in construction, and 37,000 in the service sector. The production value 
of companies from the environmental sector amounted to €83.4 billion in 2015, 
which accounted for around 6% of total industrial production. The largest mar-
ket is the production of articles in the area of  energy efficiency (€17.8 billion) 
and the generation of electricity from renewable sources (€13.8 billion), and 
the use of sewage (€17.1 billion) and household waste (€10.2 billion).
Table 5. Production of potential environmental goods in Germany in 2011–2015
sector production, in billions of euros change in %
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
2011/ 
2012
2012/ 
2013
2013/ 
2014
2014/ 
2015
Household waste 10.2 10.2 10.3 10.3 10.2 -0.5 0.6 0.7 -0.9
Sewage 16.1 16.2 16.8 17.1 17.1 0.4 3.6 2.1 -0.1
Noise 5.3 5.5 5.4 5.2 5.1 2.5 -1.8 -3.6 -1.4
Air 7.6 7.6 7.3 8.5 9.3 0.3 -3.3 15.4 9.6
Instrumentation 
and control engineering
6.7 6.9 7.0 7.3 7.5 2.1 2.2 3.1 3.0
Climate protection 37.5 35.1 33.3 33.2 33.7 -6.3 -5.1 -0.1 1.4
including 
products for the rational 
use of energy
17.9 18.1 18.1 18.0 17.8 1.4 0.0 -0.6 -1.6
128 Publikationen im Bereich Umweltökonomie, Federal Statistical Office, https://www.destatis.de/
GPStatistik/servlets/MCRFileNodeServlet/DEHeft_derivate_00032680/2190330157004.pdf
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sector production, in billions of euros change in %
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
2011/ 
2012
2012/ 
2013
2013/ 
2014
2014/ 
2015
products for rational energy 
conversion
2.7 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.2 6.0 -10.2 -10.3 -6.7
products for the use of re-
newable energy sources
16.8 14.0 12.5 12.9 13.8 16.6 -10.8 2.7 7.0
environmental goods, total 84.8 83.7 81.6 82.4 83.4 -1.3 -2.5 1.1 1.1
Industrial production 
in Germany
1366 1370 1370 1368 1382 0.3 0.1 -0.2 1.0
source: Die Umweltwirtschaft in Deutschland 2017, Federal Office for the Environment, https://www.
umweltbundesamt.de/sites/default/files/medien/1410/publikationen/171204_uba_hg_umweltwirtscha-
ftdl_bf.pdf 
330,000 people were employed in the renewable energy sector alone in Germa-
ny in 2015. Employment in the RES sector has decreased; as recently as 2012, the 
sector employed around 400,000 employees. This trend is primarily related to 
the reduction of jobs in the solar industry, where in 2010–2015 the number of 
employees fell by 71% from 107.800 to 31,600 employees. German manufacturers 
of photovoltaics could not stand the competition with foreign manufacturers, 
mainly the Chinese, who turned out to be much more cost-effective. Not even 
the introduction in 2013 of anti-dumping duties on Chinese photovoltaic panels, 
ranging from 37% to 68%, could help. In 2010–2013 alone, 30 German companies 
filed for bankruptcy. Today, the photovoltaic market no longer has any signifi-
cant producers from Germany, and the biggest companies have either filed for 
bankruptcy or been taken over by their Chinese competitors.
The situation in the wind energy sector is completely different; German com-
panies have continued to record an increase in employment there. In recent 
years offshore wind energy has been the driver of growth. In 2012–2015 the 
number of jobs in wind energy rose from 122,000 to 143,000129. In 2016, of the 
10 largest wind turbine manufacturers (75% of the global market) three pro-
ducers came from Germany: Enercon (7% of the market), Siemens (6% of the 
market) and Nordex Acciona (5% of the market)130.
129 ‘Zukunftsbranche Windindustrie bundesweit ist ein starker Beschäftigungsfaktor’, Federal 
Wind Energy Association, 21 March 2017, https://www.wind-energie.de/presse/pressemit-
teilungen/2017/zukunftsbranche-windindustrie-ist-bundesweit-ein-starker
130 REN21 report, http://www.ren21.net/gsr-2017/chapters/chapter_02/chapter_02/#wind-power 
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Figure 17. The development of employment in the RES sector in Germany
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
Hydro-electric power
Wind energy on land
Wind energy at sea
Photovoltaics
Thermal solar energy
Solar power plants
Deep geothermal energy
Shallow geothermal energy
Biogas
Liquid biomass
Biomass power plants/heating plants
Small biomass plants
Biomass
Biofuels
Public R&D/Administration
2004     2005     2006     2007     2008     2009     2010     2011     2012     2013     2014     2015    
161
194
236
277
322
340
367
382
400
371
355
330
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fossile Energien und durch erneuerbare Energieeffizienz–Ergebnisse für das Jahr 2015, Federal Ministry of 
Economy and Energy
Germany’s advantage on the RES market is evident in virtually all sectors. The 
amount of people employed in the renewable energy sector in 2016 was esti-
mated at up to 283,100. This represented around 20% of all people employed 
in the renewable energy industry in the EU. The German renewable energy 
industry has generated around 25% of the entire turnover of the European RES 
market. German companies were among the leaders on the markets for wind 
energy (with an annual turnover of €16 billion), biomass (€5.1 billion), biogas 
(€4.1 billion), and photovoltaics (€3.4 billion)131.
In decisions on economic policy, Germany’s decision-makers are guided by the 
assumption that the demand for goods and services from the green sector will 
continue to grow. This is mainly due to beliefs about the dangers posed by the 
depletion of non-renewable natural resources and the negative effects of global 
131 ‘The state of renewable energies in Europe’, EDITION 2017, 17th EurObserv'ER Report, https://
www.isi.fraunhofer.de/content/dam/isi/dokumente/ccx/2018/EurObservER-Annual-Over-
view-2017-EN-1.pdf
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warming. “Efficiency and environmental technologies will play a key role in 
the twenty-first century. The use of these technologies is becoming increas-
ingly important, primarily on the automotive and machine markets, and will 
have a significant impact on the competitiveness of enterprises”132. Whereas in 
2013 the services sector and environmental goods produced 13% of the German 
GDP, in 2025 this figure should be as high as 20% of GDP133. At the same time, as 
German officials have indicated, the global market for environmental technol-
ogy is expected to rise from €2 trillion in 2011 to €4.4 trillion in 2025. For Ger-
man politicians, supporting the development of green technologies is a way of 
searching for another specialisation for the country’s economy. It is common 
knowledge that German companies did not take a leading position in the elec-
tronics sector which developed in the 1960s and 1970s, or in the IT sector in the 
1980s and 1990s. The plan is for the production of wind power turbines, or of 
zero-emission vehicles, to guarantee sales of German products over the next 
few decades.
Konrad PoPławsKi, rafał BajczuK
132 ‘Grüne Zukunftsmärkte/Umweltschutzwirtschaft’, 26 January 2018, Federal Office for the 
Environment, https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/themen/wirtschaft-konsum/wirtschaft-
umwelt/gruene-zukunftsmaerkte-umweltschutzwirtschaft
133 Ibid.
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AnnEX
The sTaGes oF deVelopmenT oF Germany’s indusTrial policy 
German economic thought is derived from ordoliberalism, which means Ger-
many is historically reluctant to confirm the significant role of the state in the 
economic life of the country. However, both this country’s past and more re-
cent experiences have revealed the significant influence of public institutions 
on the development of the economy.
Laying the foundations of industrial policy in Germany
The foundations of German industrial policy, which persist to this day, were 
shaped in the post-war period. The concept which contributed to the formation 
of the German economic system after World War II was ordoliberalism. This 
doctrine, formed in opposition to the experience of state intervention in the 
days of the Third Reich134, assumed that the best form for managing economic 
processes was to follow the rules of the free market, and the state’s responsi-
bility was to supervise them135. The possibility of state institutions intervening 
was to be limited to situations which arose due to the abnormal functioning of 
market mechanisms (for example, when an entity obtained a monopoly mar-
ket position, or a price cartel was formed).
However, these rules have never been fully applied. As early as the 1950s, the 
state supported the development of German exports by maintaining an un-
dervalued exchange rate and introducing tax breaks for prospective indus-
tries, as well as loans and guarantees for exporters. The core of the system for 
financing exports was the KfW public bank, which offered export loans for 
small- and medium-sized enterprises, and managed the Institute of Export 
Loans, which was co-financed by commercial banks136. The system of loans 
134 The traditions of state intervention in Germany date back to the policy of the Prussian state 
in the seventeenth century. The state also actively supported the industrialisation of first 
Prussia and then the united Germany. After the First World War, Germany became “a coun-
try of corporations and cartels”, which led to a decline in the competitiveness of indus-
trial production and lower economic growth. Cf. B. Rakow, Ökologische Industriepolitik in 
Deutschland und Europa, Frankfurt 2013, p. 118.
135 M. von Prollius, Deutsche Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 2006, 
pp. 50–61. 
136 G.H. Borsdorf, Die Internationalisierung deutscher Unternehmen nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg bis 
1973, Shaker, Aachen 2007, pp. 43–44. 
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
74
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 0
4/
20
19
was supplemented by Hermes export insurance, which was itself guaranteed 
by the German government137.
Until the mid-1950s the state limited its intervention in the economy to the 
strategic sectors of heavy industry, energy and railways, and the funding of 
science by the Federal Government was limited to basic research. In 1955, how-
ever, the state began to support research in the fields of nuclear energy and 
aviation, which had commercial applications. In the 1960s, after experiences 
in implementing projects supporting R&D in the nuclear power industry, the 
state expanded the flow of financing into other industries (information tech-
nology and aerospace research) in order to achieve a strong position on foreign 
markets138. In parallel to subsidising R&D, the federal government supported 
specific industries and enterprises through interventions139 including coal, 
shipbuilding and steel140.
At the turn of the 1960s the conviction ruled in Germany that politics should 
serve not only to maintain the efficiency of the abstract market mechanism, 
but also to implement goals which are important to the community. Under the 
doctrine of the social market economy, social arguments became equally im-
portant, and in some cases even more important than taking care to uphold 
the rules of competition. These trends were reflected in legislation. The amend-
ment of the Act on stability and growth in 1967 included a provision on the 
state’s responsibility for the level of GDP growth, a high employment rate, sta-
ble prices, and the balance of trade. 
137 Enterprises applying for loans from KfW had to guarantee 20% of the equity, and 40% of its 
own shares when applying for a loan from AKA. In the case of Hermes insurance it had to 
pay 10–30% of its own shares.
138 In 1962, the government initiated a programme for the development of space exploration, 
which in 1967 included computer science, and in 1969 added marine studies and allowed aid 
to be granted to the so-called key technologies. See A. Fier, D. Harhoff, ‘Die Evolution bun-
desdeutschen Forschungs- und der Technologiepolitik: Rückblick und Bestandsaufnahme’, 
Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, 2002 (3), pp. 279–301.
139 The first major intervention was a response to the crisis in coal mining in the late 1950s. 
From 1957, its domestic production began to decline and the use of oil and natural gas ex-
panded. To address the decline in sales of domestic coal, the state adopted support pro-
grammes for the mining sector. Adopting this policy resulted in the introduction of the 
subsidies to the mining sector which are still paid out today. R. Bajczuk, ‘The uncertain fu-
ture of the coal energy industry in Germany’, OSW Commentary, 20 October 2015; https://
www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2015-10-20/uncertain-future-coal-en-
ergy-industry-germany
140 N.D. Klag, Die Liberalisierung des Gasmarktes in Deutschland, Marburg 2003, pp. 56–57.
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The economy was strongly influenced by the formation and development of cor-
poratist structures, i.e. associations and interest groups in economic and social 
life (despite the fact that efforts had been made to limit them after the war)141. 
One example of this trend was the existence of consistently reinforced and 
strongly institutionalised lobbying organisations, especially in heavy indus-
try. Federal ministries were obliged to take the views of interested industrial 
organisations into account when devising laws142. The state’s increased interest 
in conducting industrial policy resulted not only from the growing aspirations 
of society and pressure from German companies, but also from the situation in 
other industrialised countries. Germany’s major competitors of that time, in 
Japan or the US, could count on a broad scope of state support.
When the Social Democrats came to power in the 1970s, industrial policy objec-
tives were expanded, abandoning the earlier policy of not supporting deficit 
sectors, including mining. In parallel, the state began to encourage the devel-
opment of new and innovative sectors of the economy. In 1973 (as part of the 
so-called Ministererlaubnis) the economy minister was given the power to au-
thorise the takeover of companies, even if the Federal Office for Cartels (the 
German competition authority) had previously issued a negative decision. The 
minister’s decision had only to be justified on the grounds of common interest 
or benefit for the whole economy143. This provision was used in later years to 
support German companies in the energy (E.ON), finance (Deutsche Bank) and 
logistics sectors (Deutsche Post).
chancellor Kohl’s course correction to the industrial policy
In the 1980s and 1990s there was a paradigm shift under Chancellor Helmut 
Kohl (1982–1998). This was the period of neo-liberalism’s triumph in the econo-
my. The wave of liberalisation and privatisation arrived from the United States 
and Britain into West Germany as well, where the government began to limit 
the use of industrial policy, and with it to reduce the subsidies for the economy. 
However, this was not carried out in full. Coal mining was still supported, and 
141 M. von Prollius, Deutsche Wirtschaftsgeschichte nach 1945, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2006, pp. 
103–104.
142 As early as the 1960s, most of the demands on specific issues were directed primarily to the 
government (82% of letters), and to parliament to a much lesser degree. T. Rheinisch, ‘Eu-
ropaische Integration und industrielles Interesse: Die deutsche Industrie und die Gründung 
der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft’, Beiheft 152, Stuttgart 1994, pp. 43–44.
143 Since this law came into force the prerogative has been used 22 times. 
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German reunification forced the use of large public funds to reconstruct the 
East German economy and modernise its infrastructure. It was during Kohl’s 
term in office that the state moved its focus from large corporations to small- 
and medium-sized enterprises, supporting their expansion into foreign mar-
kets. An important breakthrough in changing the thinking around how to 
support industry was the establishment in the 1980s of a network of knowledge 
exchange and commercialisation which was funded by the public144. In this 
way the state became involved on a larger scale, not just in directly supporting 
industry but also in scientific research, and in promoting that research.
The symbol of the new approach to industrial policy was the process of Ger-
man reunification. Although the government had allocated significant funds 
to the reconstruction of the eastern federal states, they were directed mainly 
to the modernisation of infrastructure and social objectives, while not estab-
lishing strong instruments of support for local industry. A currency reform 
was carried out, under which the values of the eastern and western Mark were 
equalised, and the population were guaranteed a significant wage increase in 
the short term; but this was done at the cost of the rapid bankruptcy of East 
German industry, as well as a significant increase in unemployment. The ef-
fects were similar during the three-year process of privatising state-owned 
companies, which only exacerbated the problems on the labour market.
Germany’s new position also emerged in its scepticism towards the establish-
ment of a European industrial policy, which Berlin blocked145. When such a pol-
icy was finally created in 1993, at Germany’s initiative it was used mainly to 
support R&D and the regulation of rules for granting state aid, which had to be 
agreed every time with the European Commission.
The renaissance of industrial policy after 1998
During the rule of the SPD-Green coalition (1998–2005), there was a renais-
sance of German industrial policy. At that time the foundations were laid for 
the so-called ecological industrial policy146. In 2000 a law on renewable energy 
sources was enacted, under which subsidies went to support the development 
144 M. Kitson, J. Michie, The Deindustrial Revolution: The Rise and Fall of UK Manufacturing 1870-
2010, Working Paper No. 459, Centre for Business Research, 2014, p. 28.
145 B. Rakow, op. cit., p. 122.
146 Ecological industrial policy refers to achieving the objectives of economic policy in accord-
ance with the principles of sustainable development.
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of solar, wind and biomass energy in Germany. This was also associated with 
the granting of tax relief to the owners of these power plants147. Also in 2000, 
the Ministry of Economy and Technology adopted a strategy for technology 
policy which was based on supporting enterprises in the fields of innovation, 
research and technological cooperation, and was intended to increase their 
competitiveness on foreign markets.
The shift towards industrial policy was also dictated by the attitude within the 
EU of France, which pursued an active industrial policy of building national 
champions under the banner of protecting the country’s interests148. For some 
time Germany tried to follow a similar path in the fields of energy, gas, tel-
ecommunications and postal services. For example, in 2000 the energy com-
pany E.ON was established by the merger of the VEBA and VIAG companies, 
and it has now become the largest German energy company. In 2003, E.ON 
took over Ruhrgas, the largest German gas company. This takeover was only 
possible because the minister of economy issued a ministerial permit which 
ignored the negative opinions of the antitrust institutions, i.e. the Federal Of-
fice for Cartels and the Bundestag Committee on Monopolies. This situation 
led to the appearance of an oligopoly of several energy companies on a newly 
liberalised energy market149. The state also maintained preferential conditions 
for the German Post (Deutsche Post AG, privatised in 1995), German Railways 
(Deutsche Bahn) and the energy company RWE.
In 2003–2005, as part of the Agenda 2010 programme, the German govern-
ment decided to undertake reforms conducive to improving industrial com-
petitiveness, such as creating a more flexible labour market, reducing the fis-
cal burden, and reducing social benefits. The constructive position adopted by 
the trade unions was important, as for several years they had limited their 
salary expectations in order to increase employment in Germany. The reforms 
also introduced restrictions on labour costs, which helped to increase the com-
petitiveness of German industry.
147 Environmental taxes (Ökosteuer) are a series of amendments to existing laws and the imple-
mentation of the law imposing excise duty on electricity. The aim of these changes was to 
encourage the consumption of goods and services that have a lower negative impact on the 
environment.
148 B. Rakow, op. cit., p. 124.
149 S. Fischer, Die Energiewende und Europa: Europäisierungsprozesse in der deutschen Energie- und 
Klimapolitik, Wiesbaden, Germany 2017, p. 194.
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In response to the global financial crisis which broke out in 2008, the German 
government continued to conduct an active industrial policy. Investments in 
renewable energy sources were increased even more by introducing legisla-
tion favourable to their expansion; this led to the dynamic development of 
the market for photovoltaic panels and wind turbines. January 2009 saw the 
introduction of a support package for the economy through means including 
public investment, recapitalising the financial sector, and providing financial 
support and opening up regulations for industries. During the 2009 election 
campaign, there was no longer any debate on whether the state should inter-
vene in the economy at all through its industrial policy, but only on how far 
this intervention should go150.
After the elections in 2013 a coalition between the SPD and the CDU/CSU was 
re-established. The Ministry of Economy and Technology changed its name to 
the Ministry of Economy and Energy, and took over the responsibility for de-
veloping renewable energy sources; the minister’s portfolio was taken up by 
the Social Democrats’ leader Sigmar Gabriel. After eight years of being run by 
right-wing politicians, the ministry came under the control of the SPD, which 
has changed the department’s priorities and the internal hierarchy of values. 
Whereas the liberal and right-wing politicians from the FDP and the CDU/CSU 
had avoided implementing protectionist and interventionist policies, in the 
SPD’s hands the ministry had no problem implementing the objectives of eco-
nomic policy with the active participation of the state. The change was primar-
ily seen in the rhetoric, which began to emphasise the state’s active role in the 
economy, as well as the country’s industrial and technological development.
150 ‘Industriepolitik als Wahlkampfthema’, Wirtschaftswoche, 28 August 2009, http://www.wiwo.de/
politik/deutschland/staatlicher-einfluss-industriepolitik-als-wahlkampfthema/5141748.html 
